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Abstract
As concerns about the environment increase and civilians continue to become casualties of
armed conflict, we must reflect on traditional approaches and applications of International
Humanitarian law [IHL]. While the current state of IHL provides protections for civilians and
the environment, examples in practice of excessive harms to both suggest a gap exists in
these protections. Current academic literature in the field tends to focus on either the
protection of civilians or the protection of the environment, on either IHL or International
Environmental law [IEL]. This is problematic as the two are inextricably linked: civilians and
environment often, if not always, go hand in hand. This thesis seeks to close these gaps. It
begins with an examination of existing IHL and a look at two instances which resulted in
excessive harms to civilians and the environment. Next, it turns to the role of general
principles of international law, in particular the precautionary principle and the principle of
intergenerational equity in IEL, which are well-accustomed to dealing with short-term and
long-term health and environmental risks, as well as scientific uncertainty. The thesis
demonstrates how the use of these principles in military decision-making could fill the
existing gaps in IHL.
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Chapter 1
1The Ever-Increasing Costs of War to Humanity
1.1 Introduction
The protection of civilians and civilian objects has a long history in international
humanitarian law (IHL). Unfortunately, as the methods and means of warfare have
evolved and developed, the military and civilian spheres have become increasingly
intertwined and overlapping. Though IHL long predates World War II, the Battle of
Britain and the bombings of Dresden are but two instances during that war where
civilians and civilian objects became the targets of military action. Post-World War II,
the international community attempted to strengthen the existing laws with the entirety of
the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 devoted to the “Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War”.

1

In the post-World War II era, human rights and environmental concerns also
began to take on more prominent roles in international discourse and regulation.
Nonetheless, despite increased international commitment to the protection of civilians
and civilian objects in armed conflict, and amidst growing concern for the protection of
human rights and the environment, the Vietnam War saw the massacre of unarmed
2

civilians, such as the My Lai massacre, and large-scale destruction of forests and
3

vegetation through the use of chemical defoliants such as agent orange. Once again, the
international community responded with the negotiation and adoption of Additional

1

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380.
2

For a detailed account of the My Lai massacre see, for example, James Olson and Randy Roberts,eds, My
Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, 1998).
3

For a detailed examination of the use of the environmental damage caused by agent orange and means of
warfare in Vietnam see, for example, Arthur H Westing, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina
War (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1976).

2
4

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 [Additional Protocol I]. This convention
re-articulated, re-emphasized, and elaborated on the existing protections for civilians and
civilian objects in international armed conflicts and included two specific provisions
5

aimed at the protection of the environment in armed conflict. Additionally treaties were
6

later created which prohibited the use of the environment as a weapon and which banned
the use of incendiary weapons in conflict.

7

The trend has been for international responses to harms which exceed the dictates
of humanity to be reactionary, addressing the harms of the last conflict in the hopes of
preventing their repetition or reoccurrence in future conflicts. As our understanding of the
environment and the interdependencies between humanity and nature grows, so do our
technologies and capacities to wreak serious and irreversible harm to human and natural
environments not only in the short-term, but for generations to come. As the risks rise,
the time for wait-and-see and cleaning up after the fact is passing. If the international
community continues in this reactionary mode, it is increasingly likely that its reactions
will be too late to undo serious damage already inflicted on the environment,
communities, and states.

1.2 Objectives and Scope
This thesis aims to address this need to be more proactive to the approach to
protections for civilians and the environment in armed conflict. It focuses on the rules
and customs applicable to international armed conflict. While conflict can be identified as
either international (between states) or internal or non-international (within a single
state), the rules differ somewhat between the two types of conflict. For example,

4

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]
5

Additional Protocol I, ibid at Articles 35(3) and 55.

6

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD), adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res 31/72, 10 December 1976. [hereinafter
ENMOD]
7

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 10 October
1980, 1342 UNTS 171, 19 ILM at 1534. [hereinafter CCW Protocol III]
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Additional Protocol I, which is relied upon heavily in this thesis, applies to international
armed conflicts and not internal conflicts.
This thesis will examine the seeming failure in current applications of IHL to
adequately protect civilians, civilian objects, and the environment in armed conflicts.
There appears to be a breakdown in military decision-making that results in questionable
military action at the cost of civilian lives, livelihoods and environment. For example, the
continuing use of weapons with high failure rates and the potential for long-lasting harm
to both human and natural environments does not appear to be adequately considered in
weapon and target selection. Military decisions on which weapons to use and where and
when to attack are required to conform to the principles of IHL which demand
precaution, distinction between civilian and military, and a proportional balancing of
interests of military necessity and humanity. However, these principles are clearly not
enough: what is needed is more clarity in existing international legal provisions and
customs protecting civilians and the environment in armed conflict. If military decisionmakers were provided with clearer legal guidelines for balancing military necessity and
humanitarian concerns, then they would not be able to hide in the gap that currently exists
in the ambiguity of the law. Guidelines providing greater structure on considerations of
the severity of harm, the longevity of consequences, and how to address scientific
uncertainty would provide additional structure by which to guide decision-making. This
would also allow individuals, civilians, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], and
other states to better understand, evaluate and, if need be, challenge the determinations of
state military actors.
These guidelines or markers could inform the application of existing laws for the
protection of civilians and the environment in armed conflict. However, these do not need
to be new creations: rather, they already exist in international law. International
environmental law [IEL] is an existing body of law which prioritizes the protection of the
environment and human health. IEL principles can, and should, be used to inform the
interpretation and application of existing IHL. This thesis focuses on two such principles:
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle. The former states that, while the
present generation benefits from the planet and its resources, it is also under an obligation

4
to preserve the condition of the planet so as to pass it on to subsequent generations in as
8

good a condition as it was received from preceding ones . The latter requires actors to err
on the side of caution where there is evidence of a serious or irreversible risk of damage
to the environment or human health, even if scientific uncertainty surrounds that risk.

9

Together these principles incorporate both short-term and long-term considerations, as
well as considerations of environmental protection and the protection of human health,
and attempt to grapple with scientific uncertainty in an effort to protect the environment
from rash and unmeasured action. Technological advancements are occurring at such at
pace that sometimes they risk outstripping humans’ abilities to know the consequences of
their actions before they have been taken. Intergenerational equity and the precautionary
principle mandate taking a moment to consider the full extent of the consequences of
actions to avoid a realization after the fact that these actions have irrevocably damaged
the environment and endangered human health.
These principles also have strong ties to the concept of sustainable development,
which is “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

10

This entails the preservation of

natural resources for future generations, the sustainable or appropriate exploitation of
natural resources, the use of natural resources equitably between states, and the
integration of environmental concerns and considerations into economic and
developmental planning.

11

Sustainable development also provides a strong link between

the environment and armed conflict, as conflict inherently creates an obstacle to

8

See Weiss, Edith Brown. In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and
Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 1989). [hereinafter Weiss
(1989)]
9

See e.g. James Cameron, “The precautionary principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and
procedures for implementation” in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, eds, Perspectives on the
Precautionary Principle (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999) 29. [hereinafter Cameron (1999)]
10

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future [Brundtland Report]
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987) at 8. [hereinafter Brundtland Report]
11

Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, with Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie, eds, Principles of
International Environmental Law, 3d (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 207.
[hereinafter Sands et al.]

5
development. Development is about production and creation, while conflict is about
destruction. Clearly, conflict inhibits, or perhaps undoes, development. The destruction of
infrastructure and the natural environment are detrimental to health, education, and the
continued development of societies. For example, approximately 40 million school-age
children do not attend school in conflict-affected and fragile states.

12

A by-product of the

protection of civilians and the environment in armed conflict is that it also serves to
promote the long-term protection and enjoyment of sustainable development. Sustainable
development is an important component of, and link between, IEL and IHL and will be
discussed in greater detail in chapter four. However, the prevailing emphasis in this thesis
will remain on IEL.
The objective of this thesis is to advocate for an integrated IEL and IHL approach
to military decision-making, and to demonstrate the benefits of this approach through two
modern conflict examples. The first example considered is the use of cluster munitions in
or near population-dense areas during the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo. The second
example explores the use of depleted uranium weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the
2003 Iraq War.

1.3 Sources of International Law
This thesis relies upon the sources of international law. Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists the most authoritative sources of
international law:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;

12

Women’s Refugee Commission, “Ensuring Opportunities for Displaced Youth” available at:
http://womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/youth.

6
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law.13
International conventions are binding bilateral or multilateral agreements
between states and governed by international law.

14

They are more commonly referred to

as treaties, but can equally be labeled conventions, protocols, covenants, and acts.
Treaties can create legal obligations as well as legal entitlements.

16

15

The content of the

treaty is usually the result of negotiations among states or their representatives,
sometimes with the input of non-state actors such as experts and NGOs.

18

17

Once the treaty

negotiations are complete, the final draft is adopted by the parties and authenticated by
signature.

19

States consent to be bound by the treaty once they ratify it in their home state

and, once the ratification is deposited (usually with the United Nations), they are referred
to as States parties.

13

20

The formation, application and interpretation of treaties is guided

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1055, 33 UNTS 993. [hereinafter ICJ

Statute]
14

See e.g. Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2d (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 170.
[hereinafter Cassese]
15

Cassese, ibid.

16

Cassese, ibid.

17

Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012) at 56. [hereinafter Boas]
18

An excellent example of a treaty with lots of non-state involvement in the negotiating/drafting process is
the 1997 Landmine Ban Convention, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997, reprinted in IRRC, No
320, September-October 1997, pp. 563-578. [hereinafter Landmine Ban Convention]
19

Boas, supra note 17.

20

Boas, ibid.

7
by their own content as well as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).

21

Unlike treaty law, which is binding only on parties that have ratified the treaty in
question, rules of international custom are binding on all states.

22

For something to be an
23

international custom two elements are required: state practice and opinio juris.

General

state practice normally requires that the practice among states is “both extensive and
virtually uniform”.

24

The practice does not need to be universally employed by states,

rather the key is whether the practice of states is “widespread and representative” of the
international community.

25

The second required element, opinio juris, is a more

subjective element. It requires “that states undertake state practice out of a sense of legal
obligation”.

26

For a practice to be custom, it must be widely accepted and followed by

states and they must be following it because they believe that they are under a legal
obligation to do so.
The next source of international law is ‘general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations’. Generally, the outdated reference to ‘civilised’ is now ignored in
favour of understanding the source as “general principles of law recognised by the
community of nations”.

27

These principles can be sourced from many different places.

They can be principles general to the domestic law of nations, principles of international
law generally, principles that represent “general legal standards overarching the whole

21

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p.
331 available online at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b3a10. [hereinafter
VCLT]
22

Cassese, supra note 14 at 157.

23

Cassese, ibid.

24

International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, p 3, 20 February 1969, at para
74, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50645e9d2.html. [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf
case]
25

North Sea Continental Shelf case, ibid at para 73.

26

Boas, supra note 17 at 89.

27

Cassese, supra note 14 at 188.

8
body of law governing a specific area”, and so on.

28

They can also fulfill many functions,

in particular, filling gaps in international law and aiding in the interpretation of other
international law.

29

The final sources of international law – judicial decisions and the writings of
publicists – are noted as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.

30

These are not binding, formal sources of the law, but rather provide informed and
influential evidence of what the law might be or as evidence of the development of
international law.

31

Even though judicial decisions are not binding in international law,

“many decisions of the most authoritative courts (in particular the ICJ) are bound to have
crucial importance in establishing the existence of customary rules, or in defining their
scope and content, or in promoting the evolution of new concepts”.

32

Finally, there are many international instruments that have no prima facie
binding effect in international law, but can usually provide guidance in interpreting
international law, or as evidence of state practice or opinio juris to indicate the formation
of customary law. These instruments include declarations, voluntary guidelines, United
Nations General Assembly resolutions, and publications and reports by international
organizations.

33

1.4 Organization of Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter, chapter one, has introduced
the context, problem, and aim of the thesis. It also provides a basic understanding of the
sources of international law that will be relied upon in this work.

28

See Cassese, ibid at 189; Boas, supra note 17 at 106-107.

29

Cassese, ibid at 188.

30

ICJ Statute, supra note 13 at Article 38(1)(d).

31

Boas, supra note 14 at 110-115; Ian Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law, 7d (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 24-25. [hereinafter Brownlie]
32

Cassese, supra note 14 at 195.

33

See e.g. Cassese, ibid at 196-197.
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Chapter two examines the existing conventional and customary international
humanitarian law which governs international armed conflicts. It focuses first on the
protections for civilians and civilian objects under the traditional rules preventing
unnecessary suffering, and limiting the means and methods of warfare, requiring
combatants to distinguish between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian
objects and military objectives. It also discusses the IHL requirements of proportionality
and precaution. It explores the tension between the key values that are sought to be
balanced in proportionality assessments: military necessity and humanity. It then turns to
the few specific provisions which address the protection of the environment in armed
conflict. Next, chapter two outlines two modern examples in which the environment and
civilians have suffered serious harms as a result of armed conflict. These examples will
again be used in chapter six to apply the approach suggested in this thesis. Finally, this
chapter provides a brief literature review demonstrating what appears to be an arbitrary
separation of environment and civilians during conflict within academic discourse.
Chapter three turns to the source of international law that plays an integral role in
the approach suggested in the thesis: general principles of international law. This chapter
examines in great detail the many different understandings and interpretations of this
source of law. It focuses on the different and very useful functions they can fulfill in
international law, in particular in the interpretation and application of other rules of
international law. This is important for the thesis, because the proposed approach relies
on the use of general principles of international law to interpret and apply existing rules
of IHL.
Chapter four shifts the focus to IEL and examines this body of law and its
connection to sustainable development. It then explores the first general principle relied
on in the thesis: the principle of intergenerational equity. The definition, history,
evolution, and legal status of intergenerational equity are examined. It then examines in
greater detail applications of intergenerational equity in the context of human rights to
environmental protection and health.

10
Chapter five focuses on the second general principle of IEL relied on in this
thesis: the precautionary principle. The evolution, definition, and legal status of the
principle are explored. Particular attention is paid to the key elements of the principle:
threat of harm and scientific uncertainty. The differences between precaution and
proportionality under the precautionary principle are examined, and compared to the
same concepts in IHL.
Chapter six intertwines all of the elements introduced in the four preceding
chapters. It examines the application of IEL in armed conflicts and shows that it does not
cease to apply once hostilities begin, but remains a consideration for military decisionmakers applying IHL. The chapter then returns to the examples initially outlined in
chapter two, applying first the specific environmental IHL provisions and, then, the
proposed proportionality assessment employing the principles of IEL as guiding markers.
Through these examples, this chapter demonstrates that a proportionality assessment
carried out using the intergenerational equity and precautionary principles help to
interpret and inform the provisions on the protection of civilians and civilian objects,
such as the environment, and would provide increased protection for civilians and the
environment in armed conflict.
Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusion to the thesis. It restates the research
problem and summarizes the findings. It reiterates that there is a gap in existing
protections under international humanitarian law for civilians and the environment. It
emphasizes that general principles of international law are tools which often function to
unify the law, fill gaps and aid in interpretation. The inextricable link between humans
and the environment, both in peacetime and wartime, makes principles of international
environmental law well-suited to take on a unifying, gap-filling, and interpretive role
under international humanitarian law. The ability of intergenerational equity and the
precautionary principle to account for serious or irreversible harm, scientific uncertainty,
and short and long-term risks and consequences provides the guidelines that are missing
in existing international humanitarian protections. These guidelines can serve to aid in
military decision-making in order to decrease the instances in which excessive harm to
civilians and the environment is the outcome of attack. The application of these principles

11
in examining examples from the Kosovo conflict and the Iraq war support this
conclusion. The final chapter will then outline and acknowledge the limitations of the
research, such as the focus only on international conflicts and the consideration of only
two principles outside of international humanitarian. Finally, avenues for further research
will be proposed, for example, the applicability of other principles of international law in
military decision-making and the extension of these strengthening protections for
civilians and the environment to internal armed conflicts.

12

Chapter 2
2

The Current Status of International Humanitarian Law:
Existing Protections for Civilians and the Environment in
Armed Conflict

2.1 Introduction
Over the last two hundred years, there has been an evolution and emergence of a
strong and expansive body of law designed to govern situations of armed conflict when,
for all intents and purposes, all other order has broken down. Several key themes, or
overarching principles, dominate this body of law, which is referred to as international
humanitarian law (IHL). Three important threads running through IHL are: the limitation
of the means of warfare; the prevention of unnecessary suffering; and the restriction of
damage to military targets. All three of these threads are interrelated and have
overlapping areas of concern: this serves to emphasize both their mutual and independent
importance.
This chapter will explore each of these themes in turn. The first theme, the
limitation on the means of warfare, emphasizes that the means of warfare are not
unlimited. Rather, restrictions are placed on military actors as to the types of weapons
they may and may not use in conflicts. The second theme, the prevention of unnecessary
suffering, seeks to limit warfare so as to avoid the infliction of superfluous harm and
suffering to both combatants and civilians. It limits military actors to the minimum means
necessary to achieve victory and protects humanitarian considerations in the conduct of
hostilities. Third, military actors are restricted to targeting and attacking combatants and
military objectives. They must at all times distinguish civilians and civilian objects from
combatants and military objectives. Next, the principles of precaution and proportionality
will be examined. The former demands that all ‘feasible precautions’ are taken to avoid
damage to civilian objects and civilian casualties. The latter demands a balancing
assessment which weighs the military advantage, or military necessity, of an operation
with the damage that will be inflicted, particularly in terms of incidental, or collateral,
damage to civilians. Finally, the two key considerations of IHL – military necessity and

13
humanity – are examined, along with the inherent tension between the two concepts. The
chapter then turns to the specific provisions in IHL for the protection of the environment.
While the environment is indirectly protected, as a civilian object, by provisions
protecting civilians and civilian objects, there are also provisions which directly protect
the environment in armed conflict.
This discussion demonstrates that there are, formally, a great number of
protections in IHL for both civilians and the environment. Unfortunately, practice
suggests that these protections are not fully or adequately realized in application. This
chapter attempts to demonstrate this by outlining two examples from recent conflicts in
Kosovo and Iraq in which the harms and threats to civilians and the environment seem to
exceed the boundaries of their IHL protections. The chapter then reviews a selection of
academic literature that suggests a gap in academic discourse which fails to appreciate
the inextricable link between humans and the environment. Ultimately, this chapter aims
to provide the necessary foundation of existing IHL and to identify a problem within
existing IHL that this thesis will address.

2.2 Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects in
International Humanitarian Law
2.2.1 Limitation on the Means of Warfare
Enshrined in Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I 1977 is the rule that “[i]n any
armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of
warfare is not unlimited.”

34

That the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited is

also a widely embraced key tenet of customary IHL.

35

In its most simple form, the

limitation on means of warfare is seen in the wide array of weapon ban conventions in

34
35

Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 35(1).

Christopher Greenwood, “The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)” in Malcolm D Evans, ed,
International Law,2d, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 783 at 795. [hereinafter Greenwood] This is
also stated in Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, 18 October, 1907, 187 CTS 227; 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; and, Article
35(1) of Additional Protocol I, ibid.
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36

existence: from a prohibition on expanding bullets in the Hague Convention 1899
prohibition of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gasses by Convention in 1925,
ban on blinding lasers in 1995,
ban of 2008.

40

38

the Landmine Ban of 1997,

39

37

to the

to a

and the cluster munitions

These are but a few of the means of warfare subject to specific restriction

or outright prohibition.

41

While the principle that the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited is
established law, this does not mean that conventions restricting, limiting or banning
weapons are always easily adopted. They are often the product of lengthy negotiations
and not all achieve universal support. The case of landmines, and more recently cluster
munitions, are prime examples. Both are currently the subject of separate agreements
prohibiting their use, but many key States are not party to these agreements, such as the
United States, China, and Russia. These are major world powers and all stockpile,
produce, and have used cluster munitions in conflict.

42

In the case of the Landmine Ban,

the process to create the Convention was well publicized with the support of a great
number of states and was an important moment for the rise of non-governmental

36

Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899 reprinted in The Laws of
Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J
Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 69-93[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
37

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 UST 571, 94 LNTS 65.
38

United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 13 October 1995,
United Nations CCW/CONF.I /7. [hereinafter 1980 CCW]
39

Landmine Ban Convention, supra note 18.

40

Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, CCM/77, available at:
http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf.
41

Other examples include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological
Weapons Convention), 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163; 11 ILM 309 (1972); and, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), 3 September 1992, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993).
42

Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munitions Information Chart” (2010), available at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010.4.5%20Arms,%20Cluster,%20Info%20Chart
%20Final.pdf.
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organizations [NGOs], which were integral in championing the cause to a successful
conclusion.

43

Unfortunately, not all States chose to become parties to the Convention.

These non-party states include China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United
States.

44

This is of concern because it is estimated that these states have more than 157

million stockpiled landmines amongst them.

45

Additionally, their resistance to accept the

ban could provide a barrier to a customary prohibition developing. It is often the case,
where States hesitate or refrain from participating in weapons bans, they do so on the
grounds that the weapon in question has military utility that makes it an essential part of a
military’s arsenal.

46

This is an eloquent illustration of a key tension in IHL between

claims of military necessity and the dictates of humanity. On the one hand, military actors
want to use whatever means are available to them to achieve military victory. On the
other hand, the dictates of humanity seek to protect those who do not participate in
hostilities from the harms of military action, particularly where these military operations
are, perhaps, excessive.

2.2.2 Prevention of Unnecessary Suffering
The limitation on means of warfare is closely linked to a second thread in IHL:
the prevention or avoidance of unnecessary suffering. The International Court of Justice
[ICJ] has referred to the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering to combatants as
the second cardinal principle of humanitarian law.

47

The terms ‘superfluous injury’ or

43

See, for example, Maxwell A Cameron, Brian W Tomlin, and Bob Lawson, eds, To Walk Without Fear:
The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
44

ICRC, “Landmine Stockpile Destruction”, (December 2006), available at:
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/mines-destruction-factsheet-010906.htm.
45

46

ICRC, “Landmine Stockpile Destruction”, ibid.

For example, during the Kosovo conflict, the United Kingdom and United States defended the use of
cluster munitions by emphasizing the military utility of the weapon, that they possess “exceptional
effectiveness against specific types of targets”. See Richard Moyes, “Cluster Munitions in Kosovo:
Analysis of use, contamination and casualties” (2007) at 25, available at:
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster%20Munitions%20in%20Kosovo.pdf. [hereinafter
Moyes]
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‘unnecessary suffering’ appear extensively in instruments of IHL

48

and it is firmly

established in customary IHL that the use of weapons causing superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering is expressly forbidden.

49

This concept was first codified in Article

16 of the Lieber Code of 1863, written during the American Civil War, which states,
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty -- that is, the
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for
revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of
torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of
poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a
50
district.
This tenet was first codified in a treaty in the preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration, which states that “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable” goes beyond the legitimate
means of warfare.

51

Now, nearly 150 years later, the concept is solidly established by

47

International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, UN
document A/51/218 at para 78. [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons case]
48

Additional Protocol I Article 35(2); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions,
Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2004) 179-184 (preamble); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May
1996) United Nations CCW/CONF.I/ 16 at Article 6(2); Landmine Ban Convention, supra note 18
(preamble); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9* at Article
8(2)(b)(xx) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
49

Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, “Practice Relating to Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature
to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering” in Customary Humanitarian Law Vol I: Rules
(Cambridge: ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009) online: <http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs> [hereinafter ICRC Study].
50

US War Department, General Orders 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (1863) [Lieber Code], reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of
Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, ed D Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2004) 3–23[Laws of Armed Conflict].
51

Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight.
Saint Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868 reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts, eds, D
Schindler and J Toman (Boston: Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 1988) 102. [hereinafter St. Petersburg
Declaration]
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convention and customary law as an inviolable rule of IHL.

52

It exemplifies efforts to

protect principles of humanity in armed conflict by limiting the legitimate means of
warfare to the minimal necessary to secure victory. Such victory should never be
achieved by inflicting unnecessary cruelty and suffering which serves no purpose and
provides no additional legitimate benefit to military efforts.

2.2.3 Restriction to Military Targets
The most important thread running through IHL, and the cardinal principle of IHL
according to the ICJ, is the protection of civilians and civilian objects, with the
requirement of distinction between military and civilian, combatant and non-combatant
targets.

53

The primacy of the principle of distinction represents the overarching and all-

encompassing need in IHL to preserve the principles of humanity from being completely
subordinated to interests of military necessity. While war may be a chaotic state in which
traditional law and order have broken down, under this principle, civilians and civilian
objects are not legitimate targets for belligerents. It is for this reason that IHL bans
indiscriminate attacks

54

- this ban will be discussed in greater depth below.

The principle of distinction is first articulated in the preamble to the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration, which states that “the only legitimate object which States should
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.

55

It

follows that, if the only legitimate target is opposing military forces, then one must be
able to distinguish between opposing military forces and other individuals or objects
which do not fall under that heading.

52

For example, Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I states “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”
While Article 13 of the fourth Geneva Convention states that the provisions of Part II are “intended to
alleviate the sufferings caused by war.”
53

Nuclear Weapons case, supra at note 47.

54

See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Articles 51(4) and (5).

55

St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 51 at 102.

18
The principle of distinction therefore requires that belligerents, or combatants, and
their military objects be distinguished from civilians and civilian objects. This basic rule
is codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I 1977 and states as follows,
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
56
military objectives.
Civilian and civilian population are defined in Article 50 of the same Protocol, which
states:
Art 50. Definition of civilians and civilian population
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and
(6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In
case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are
civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals
who do not come within the definition of civilians does not
57
deprive the population of its civilian character.
It is important to note that, in Article 50(1), a presumption is created in favour of
determining someone to be a civilian where there is doubt as to their status. This is
important because it means that a soldier must be certain of the combatant status of an
individual before that individual may become a legitimate target of attack.
The principle of distinction applies not only to distinguishing between combatants
and non-combatants, or civilians, but also in terms of objects. Belligerents must
distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, with the latter barred from

56

Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 48.

57

Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 50.

19
being the subject of attack. Military objectives are defined in Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I, which states:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
58
advantage.
This definition is also a rule of customary IHL, according to Rule 8 of the ICRC Study on
customary IHL.

59

Rule 8 does not provide any elaboration on the content of the definition

found in Article 52(2), though the commentary on Rule 8 does provide insight into how
the definition is addressed in many military manuals of states. For instance, many
military manuals “state that the presence of civilians within or near military objectives
does not render such objectives immune from attack.”

60

Also, “numerous military

manuals and official statements consider that an area of land can constitute a military
objective if it fulfils the conditions contained in the definition.”

61

However, it should be

noted that there are differing interpretations of the definition of military objectives,
centering primarily around the understanding of the phrases “effective contribution” and
“military advantage”. For example, the United States interprets both phrases more
broadly than other states and entities such as the International Committee of the Red

58

Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 52(2).

59

ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives”.

60

See ICRC Study, ibid at “Rule 8”. The list of state military manuals includes Australia, Canada,
Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Hungary, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain,
Switzerland and the United States.
61

See ICRC Study, ibid “Rule 8”. The list of state military manuals includes Australia, Belgium, Benin,
Ecuador, France, Italy, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom
and the United States. Official statements are noted from the following states Belgium, Canada, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, United Kingdom and the
United States.
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Cross [ICRC].

62

Those states adopting a broad interpretation tend to consider the military

advantage of an attack as a whole rather than on the basis of individual parts of the
attack.

63

This means that the advantage of individual parts of the attack may in fact be

uncertain, so long as there is a definite overall advantage to the larger operation as a
whole. Furthermore, the ICRC study found that military manuals of states, including the
United States, Australia and Canada, do not find the presence of civilians in or near an
objective as rendering the objective immune from attack, such as in the case of civilians
working in a munitions factory.

64

The definition of civilian object found in Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I
does add somewhat to our understanding of how to distinguish military from civilian
objects. While Article 52(1), defined above, merely provides that civilian objects are all
objects which are not military objectives and are prohibited from being the subject of
65

attack or reprisal , article 52(3) provides an important addition:
In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
66
used.
This paragraph creates an important presumption in favour of determining an object to be
civilian. Such objects therefore must be protected from attack where there is doubt as to
whether they are being used to make an effective contribution to military action. If a
civilian object is used for a military purpose, it can become a legitimate target for military
attack, but careful assessment must be made and all feasible precautions taken to avoid
attacking a civilian object.

62

For example, see discussion in Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law” (2000) 22 Mich J Int’l L 85 (HeinOnline) at 100-103.
[hereinafter Wiebe]
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ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives”.

64

ICRC Study, ibid.
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Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 52(1).

66

Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 52(3).
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The ban on indiscriminate attacks is an established norm of customary IHL

67

and

is also codified in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I 1977. Article 51(4) of Additional
Protocol I defines indiscriminate attacks as follows:
Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by
68
this Protocol.
This means that belligerents must not be indiscriminate either in their target selection or
in their choice of weapon.
In the ICRC Study on customary IHL indiscriminate attacks are covered under
Rules 11 (prohibition of indiscriminate attacks) and 12 (definition of indiscriminate
attacks).

69

One key difference between the definition in Article 51(4) of Additional

Protocol I (above) and Rule 12 of the ICRC study is that under 51(4)(c) it states “cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol” whereas under customary IHL, it is effects which
cannot be limited as required under international humanitarian law. This is an important
distinction that increases protections beyond the scope of Additional Protocol I to include
all conventional and customary rules of IHL, thereby incorporating not only protections
included in Additional Protocol I but also the entire body of protections contained in
customary IHL. This is particularly important because customary international law binds
every state in the world automatically, whether they are party to a treaty codifying this

67

ICRC study, supra note 49 at “Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks”.

68

Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 51(4).

69

ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks” and “Rule 12. Definition of
Indiscriminate Attacks”.
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custom or not.

70

Rule 71 of the ICRC Study on customary IHL expressly prohibits

weapons that are by their very nature indiscriminate.

71

This is important because it means

that militaries may not employ weapons that cannot distinguish between civilians and
combatants or between civilian objects and military objectives, although, deciding
whether a particular weapon is prohibited due to indiscriminacy where there is no
additional ban on the weapon itself remains uncertain.

72

This risks ambiguity in practice

if some states believe a weapon may be prohibited on grounds of indiscriminacy, while
others feel a weapon is legal until otherwise prohibited by a specific weapons ban.

2.2.4 Precaution and Proportionality
There remain two further important elements to the assessment of contemplated
military actions: precaution and proportionality. Both conventional and customary IHL
require military actors to take all feasible precautions to ensure that the objects of attack
are military, and that the methods and means of attack are chosen to avoid, or at least
minimize, the potential for injury or death to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
These requirements for precaution are codified in Articles 57 and 58 of Additional
73

74

Protocol I and articulated in the ICRC Study Rules 15-24.

The requirement to “do

everything feasible” and “take all feasible precautions” is a stringent one, but one
necessary to ensure that military objectives do not unjustly take primacy over
humanitarian concerns.
The principle of proportionality in armed conflict is a very important one, but it is
also tricky because it introduces greater complexity and a degree of ambiguity to the

70

See, for example, Cassese, supra note14 at 157.

71

ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 71 Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate”.

72

ICRC Study, ibid “Rule 71”.
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Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 57 and Article 58.

74

ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 15. Precautions in Attack”; “Rule 16. Target Verification”; “Rule
17. Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare”; Rule 18. Assessment of the Effects of Attacks”; “Rule 19.
Control During the Execution of Attacks”; “Rule 20. Advance Warning”; “Rule 21. Target Selection”;
“Rule 22. Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks”; “Rule 23. Location of Military
Objectives outside Densely Populated Areas”; and “Rule 24. Removal of Civilians and Civilian Objects
from the Vicinity of Military Objectives”.
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principle of distinction and the prohibition of attacks on civilians and civilian objects.
The principle of proportionality foresees the likelihood of civilian injury and/or death as a
result of a legal (by IHL standards) attack. Michael Schmitt defines it as the:
[…] requirement to select the method or means of attack
likely to cause the least collateral damage or incidental
injury, all other things being equal, relative to the military
75
advantage obtained.
The principle is codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57 of Additional Protocol I and
reiterated as a principle of customary international law in Rule 14 of the ICRC Study.
The principle of proportionality means that every time a civilian is killed or injured in
armed conflict, or every time a civilian object is destroyed or damaged, this does not
automatically mean a violation of IHL has occurred.

76

One must examine each incident

individually and evaluate whether the requirements of this principle, and the others
already discussed, have been observed. Application of the principle of proportionality can
be complicated. As Schmitt notes, “[p]roportionality calculations are heterogeneous,
because dissimilar value genres – military and humanitarian – are being weighed against
each other.”

77

This complexity is appreciated and ongoing violations of IHL serve to

demonstrate that something more is needed to help apply this principle.

2.2.5 Military Necessity and Humanity
Military necessity and humanity are the twin pillars of IHL. No military action
can be taken in conflicts without performing the delicate, or not so delicate as the case
may be, dance of evaluation back and forth between these two values. As noted above,
this is often a difficult task, as the two values do not often partner easily.78 Military
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Michael N Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare” (1999) 2 Yale Hum Rts &
Dev LJ 143 (HeinOnline) at 150. [hereinafter Schmitt (1999)]
76

Amnesty International, ‘Collateral Damage’ or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by
NATO During Operation Allied Force (2000), online: Amnesty International
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR70/018/2000> at 8. [hereinafter Amnesty International,
“Collateral Damage”]
77

Schmitt (1999), supra note 75 at 150-151.
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Schmitt (1999), ibid.
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necessity justifies all military action in accordance with IHL, provided the principle of
proportionality is respected, in order to defeat one’s opponent in an economical and
efficient manner.79 Meanwhile, humanity prevents all military action which is
unnecessary to defeating one’s opponent if the action is disproportionate to military
gains.80 While it might seem straightforward to some, at least on paper, it is a very
complicated determination involving numerous conflicting and seemingly unanswerable
issues. “Force preservation is a crucial concern for the military” notes Amnesty
International, “[b]ut can this consideration take precedent over legal obligations to protect
civilians?”81 For Amnesty International it would seem the answer is a resounding,
“No!”,

82

but it is not so simple as that. One must remember that IHL, by incorporating

the principles of military necessity, humanity, and proportionality, has necessarily
introduced a certain amount of balancing, flexibility, and sometimes ambiguity, into
armed conflict.
Bolstering the pillar of humanity in IHL is what is known as the Martens Clause.
This Clause originates in the 1899 Hague Convention and reads as follows,
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high
contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity,
83
and the requirements of the public conscience.
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Waldemar A Solf, “Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary
International Law and Under Protocol I” (1986) 1 Am UJ Int’l L & Pol’y 117 (HeinOnline) at 128.
[hereinafter Solf]
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Solf, ibid.
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Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage” supra note 76 at 15.
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Amnesty International criticizes what it sees as an unbalanced prioritization to avoid force casualties at
the cost of civilian casualties and damages. See, Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage”, ibid at 17.
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Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 53 [hereinafter Solis] (referencing James Brown Scott, ed, The
Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918) at
101-102).
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It recognizes the difficulty in addressing all potential situations that might arise in armed
conflict in the provisions of a treaty, thereby providing protections in context not
necessarily expressly covered by treaty. Since its original articulation in 1899, the Clause
has been rearticulated in the Geneva Conventions, its Additional Protocols and many
other IHL treaties.

84

The Martens Clause was recognized as a rule of customary international law by the
ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.

85

Judge Shahabuddeen, in his dissenting

opinion from that case, discussed the Martens clause and concluded that, in the context of
armed conflicts, “the Martens Clause provides authority for looking beyond treaty law
and custom to consider principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience.”

86

This position is supported by the International Law Commission [ILC],

which has stated that the clause “provides that[,] even in cases not covered by specific
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. "

87

As important a rule as the Martens Clause is, Rupert Ticehurst notes that it is
“subject to a variety of interpretations”.

88

These interpretations range from more narrow

interpretations which conceive of the Clause as a mere “reminder that customary
international law continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty norm”, to the most
expansive interpretations which see the Clause as mandating that “conduct in armed
conflicts is not only judged according to treaties and custom but also to the principles of

84

See Solis, ibid at 53.
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Nuclear Weapons case, supra note 47.
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Nuclear Weapons case, ibid (Judge Shahabuddeen, dissent).
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UN Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, 2 May -22 July
1994, GAOR A/49/10, p. 317.
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Rupert Ticehurst, “The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict” (1997) International Review of
the Red Cross No 317, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm.
[hereinafter Ticehurst]
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international law referred to by the Clause.”

89

Despite these varying interpretations, the

existence of the Martens Clause provides strong support for the inclusion of the laws, or
principles, of humanity in IHL.

2.3 Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian
Law
The environment is protected, to an extent, within IHL. There are two provisions
codified in Additional Protocol I 1977 for its protection. Article 35(3) of that instrument
states that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.”

90

Article 55 of the Protocol further states that:

1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals
91
are prohibited.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its extensive and highly authoritative
study of customary IHL, finds there are two rules on the environment established as
customary IHL. Rule 44 in the study, on “Due Regard for the Natural Environment in
Military Operations”, states:
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due
regard to the protection and preservation of the natural
environment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to

89

Ticehurst, ibid.

90

Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 at Article 35.

91

Additional Protocol I, ibid at Article 55.
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minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of
scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of
certain military operations does not absolve a party to the
92
conflict from taking such precautions.
There are three important elements to the Rule articulated by the ICRC. First, the
methods and means of warfare are limited for the protection and preservation of the
natural environment. Weapons must be chosen with consideration to their potential
effects on the environment. Second, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or
minimize incidental damage to the environment when conducting military operations.
This means that not only the selection of the weapon, but the method of the attack, and
the actions taken in the attack, must all be considered through a lens which seeks to
minimize potential damage to the environment. Finally, the final sentence of the Rule
makes it clear that scientific uncertainty does not absolve military actors from the
responsibility of taking all feasible precautions to protect the environment. This means
that even where the risk of environmental damage is not scientifically certain, precautions
to avoid potential environmental damage should be taken.
To support this rule of customary IHL, the ICRC refers, inter alia, to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991, which addressed Iraq’s international
legal responsibility for environmental damage caused in its invasion of Kuwait.
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This is

important because it sanctions Iraq’s deliberate acts, of igniting oil pumps on fire, which
caused serious environmental degradation in the region. Further, the ICRC references
environmental law’s precautionary principle as an expression of the final element of rule
44. It does this by invoking the key concepts of the precautionary principle: threat of
serious damage to the environment, scientific uncertainty, and the need to take
precautions despite this uncertainty. However, the reference to the precautionary
principle in this context is limited to environmental protection and is not used to extend to

92

ICRC Study, supra note 49 at “Rule 44. Due Regard for the Natural Environment in Military
Operations”.
93
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situations dealing with civilian health and safety.

94

This is limiting because scientific

uncertainty surrounding certain weapons often poses a threat to civilian health, and risks
to the environment are closely linked to human health. While human health may still be
protected indirectly by this reference, the failure to note the important link between health
and the environment is part of a larger arbitrary separation of humanity and the natural
environment.
The second rule protecting the environment in armed conflict, according to the
ICRC’s study, is Rule 45 on “Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment”,
which states:
The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of
95
the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.
The ICRC cites numerous sources to show that significant state practice has emerged to
support this rule. The ICRC found this prohibition in the military manuals of no less than
20 states, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia.
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It also found

national legislation which creates an offence for causing widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the environment in over 20 countries including Australia, Burundi,
Canada, and the United Kingdom.
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Despite strong evidence of state practice, the ICRC

also notes the existence of state practice that brings into question the status of this rule.
In particular, some states have objected to the phrase “may be expected to cause” found
in Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, and have claimed it is does not reflect
customary international law.
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For example, the United Kingdom and United States have

both suggested that Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I do not represent
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customary law.

99

On the other hand, Article 55 of Additional Protocol I “may … reflect

current customary law”, according to the Final Report of the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

100

Unfortunately, these objections and tentative assessments (the Report did not
categorically endorse the customary status of the Article) do create a certain air of
uncertainty when it comes to definitively saying whether or not the content of the ICRC’s
Rule 45 is customary IHL.
The second part of Rule 45 is, however, more firmly established. That the
destruction of the environment may not be used as a weapon is further codified in the
1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, more commonly referred to as ENMOD.

101

The key difference

between protections afforded in ENMOD and those found in Articles 35 and 55 of
Additional Protocol I is that the former prohibits the deliberate use of technology to
modify the environment, whereas the latter address effects of a method or means of
attack.
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Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the provisions of

ENMOD represent customary IHL.
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Apart from the treaty provisions and customary laws specifically targeting the
protection of the environment in armed conflict based on an appreciation, for the most
part, of its intrinsic value, a case can also be made that protections can be found on an
anthropocentric level within the laws protecting civilian objects. As a civilian object, the
protection of the environment will also be a consideration under the provisions protecting
civilian objects, such as Article 48, requiring distinction between civilian objects and
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military objectives, Article 51(4) which prohibits indiscriminate attacks, Article 57 which
requires all feasible precautions be taken, and under Article 58 which requires
proportionality in order to balance military necessity and the dictates of humanity. This
means that threats to the environment can and should be considered in proportionality
assessments of military operations. It is beneficial to the interests of environmental
protection to embrace both the more ecocentric protections as well as this anthropocentric
avenue as a civilian object. The more tools available for the protection of the
environment, the greater the strength not simply of IHL or IEL, but public international
law as a whole. The more weight behind demands that these laws be respected, and the
more force behind condemnations when belligerents fail to adequately respect these laws,
the greater the steps that are taken to better protect civilians and the environment.

2.4 Civilian and Environmental Protections during Armed
Conflicts in Practice: Theory vs. Practice
As can be seen in the discussion in the first part of this chapter, there are many
protections for civilians and civilian objects in IHL. The second part of the chapter
demonstrates that there are also some protections for the environment. Many, if not all,
of, these key protections are enshrined in customary IHL and therefore apply to all actors
in conflicts. Therefore, no state is immune to the obligations they create and the
protections they provide for civilians and the environment. That said, the flexibility and
ambiguity of IHL still allows attacks which cause a great deal of harm to civilians and the
environment to occur. Let us turn briefly to two specific examples of more recent
conflicts in which civilians and the environment appear to have suffered excessively.

2.4.1 NATO bombings in Kosovo
In 2000, NATO faced allegations of violations of IHL for its military campaign in
Kosovo. It drew criticism both for target selection and weapon choice, specifically the
use of cluster munitions in proximity to civilian populations.

104

One particular attack

occurred in May 1999 on the village of Niš in Serbia. The NATO bombing occurred on a
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Wiebe, supra note 62 at 100-103.
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Sunday, market day. The air convoy deployed cluster munitions, which landed on the
village market and hospital. According to NATO officials, the real target was a nearby
airport, but (speculated) technical malfunctions led to the release of the cluster munitions
at the wrong time and therefore to civilian losses.

105

As Virgil Wiebe points out, this

choice of weapon was questionable, since there were civilian suburbs very near the
airport.

106

While there was no evidence that NATO deliberately targeted civilians,

according to officials with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], who investigated this and other bombings carried out by NATO during the
Kosovo campaign,

107

the attack was nonetheless problematic with regard to a number of

established rules of IHL, including the rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks since the
nature of cluster munitions is such that the dispersal of submunitions cannot be controlled
and cannot distinguish between military and civilian objects or individuals..
Cluster bombs are bombs which contain a number of smaller explosive bomblets.
When the larger bomb explodes, it disperses the smaller bomblets over a larger area than
a single bomb could cover. As such, cluster bombs strike multiple points, as opposed to a
traditional bomb or warhead, which strikes only one location. The dispersal of the
bomblets is not, and cannot, be controlled. Typically, bomblet dispersal can cover a range
of 350 to 500 meters.
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Upon impact, the bomblets are intended to explode, resulting in

shrapnel dispersal which can cover an additional 150 meters.
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Even when they function

as intended, cluster bombs pose a risk to civilians and civilian objects if used in their
proximity because the dispersal of bomblets and of shrapnel is uncontrolled and does not
distinguish between civilian and military targets. A further risk is posed by the number of
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bomblets which fail to explode on initial impact and therefore become de facto
landmines, posing ongoing risk to civilians and polluting the environment in which they
lay. The predicted failure rate ranges from 2-6%; however, the actual failure rate in
Kosovo was clearly higher, according to some reports, with estimates ranging from 812% or even 20%.

110

With these facts and figures about cluster munitions, it is difficult to see how any
use of these munitions could meet the requirements in IHL for a legitimate attack. The
use of cluster munitions near civilian populations fails to appreciate the short-term and
long-term risks to civilians, civilian objects and the environment.

2.4.2 Depleted Uranium Weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003
Iraq War
Both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War saw the use of depleted uranium
weapons by Coalition forces. Since uranium is a toxic metal,

111

it inherently raises

concerns with respect to the health risks it poses to civilians and combatants, as well as to
potential short-term and long-term environmental risks. The impact and combustion of
depleted uranium weapons can also create an aerosolized powder which can disperse and
contaminate large areas, as well as be inhaled by people.
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One significant issue when

dealing with depleted uranium weapons is the significant scientific uncertainty associated
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with their long-term effects.

113

This is exacerbated by the fact that it takes time to

conduct the research to determine the effects over time. Among potential concerns from
the use of depleted uranium weapons are kidney and lung damage, birth defects, and
cancer.

114

While the risks of depleted uranium weapons are not definitive, they are

potentially severe and long-term. Arguably the health risks posed by these weapons are
indiscriminate as they cannot be targeted solely at military targets and, even if they could
be specifically targeted, a weapon which can cause cancer, birth defects and kidney and
lung disease would seem to qualify as a weapon causing unnecessary suffering,
particularly if the effects could arise and last long after a conflict has been decided.

115

Decisions to use these weapons of unknown risk suggests a failure to adequately
consider scientific uncertainty in the military decision-making process. Since so much
uncertainty exists, it merits consideration that an alternative weapon or method perhaps
be used while greater research is conducted to better understand the risks to civilians and
environment from depleted uranium.

2.4.3 Conclusion
There appears to be a disconnect between IHL protections for civilians, civilian
objects, and the environment in theory and in practice. The codified protections seem
extensive, while, in practice we see instant and lasting civilian casualties, damage and
destruction to civilian objects, and short-term and long-term environmental damage. The
two examples explored above suggest that existing IHL protections for civilians and the
environment are not receiving their due regard in military decision-making or that there
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are gaps in existing IHL which provide insufficient guidance on how it should be applied
in practice. The cases discussed above have received some challenge from actors in the
international community but these challenges have come to nothing and the voices have
slowly died for the most part.

116

These voices are important and should be listened to.

The challenges to these weapons represent an increasing awareness of the need to better
enforce protections for civilians and the environment in armed conflict. Meanwhile the
actors behind these questionable attacks continue on under the banner of military
necessity. States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom continue to support
the use of depleted uranium weapons. Though the United Kingdom has ratified the 2008
Cluster Munitions Convention, the United States, as mentioned above, is not party to this
treaty and maintains the right to employ these weapons. The gap which provides leeway
in favour of military actors allows states to continue using these weapons despite growing
concern over the excessive risks they pose to civilians and the environment. The
existence of this gap means that it is currently difficult to articulate a case against these
actors as having violated IHL. This fact does not seem congruent with the objective of
protections in place within conventional and customary IHL for civilians and the
environment. What emerges from this analysis is an overlooked problem in IHL: the laws
and protections for civilians and the environment, as formally articulated, do not seem to
be fully realized in practice.

2.5 Literature Review: Two Spheres Considered in Isolation
There has been much academic discussion and debate on the protection of
civilians and the environmental in armed conflict.
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However, for the most part, this
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academic critique has remained within the scope of either IHL or environmental law and
rarely are the two bodies of law examined in tandem. Further, the focus often tends to be
on either the protection of civilians in armed conflict or the protection of the
environment, which fails to appreciate the inextricable link between people and the
environment.
There is ample material exploring the issue of civilian protection in armed
conflict. For example, Gary Solis, a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the U.S. Marines,
retired Professor of Law at the U.S. Military Academy and former Director of West
Point’s Law of War Program, is well situated to provide a thorough and detailed
118

examination of the IHL. In his book, The Law of Armed Conflict,

he examines the

difficulties of defining a legal objective, interprets legal definitions of ‘military
objective’, evaluates the legitimacy of potential targets based on use, examines the
process of making targeting decisions, and looks at the law surrounding indiscriminate
attacks.
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These are important areas to examine as they are often points of ambiguity or

disagreement within the field. For example, given the differing interpretations of military
objective noted above, this can affect whether something is seen as legitimate or
illegitimate target for military action. Other scholars, such as Jose-Thota Betcy, also
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examine the ambiguities in the definition of ‘military objective’.

120

Betcy examines

violations of the civilian immunity norm and seeks to understand their occurrence.
Whereas Solis identifies potential issues in the law, Betcy seeks to identify the source of
violations in practice, though his focus remains staunchly on civilians and armed
conflict.

121

Betcy conducted interviews with experts in IHL and with belligerents in

African conflicts to conclude that the continuing occurrence of violations of civilian
immunity are the result of a disconnect between the interpretation of legal protections for
civilians in the minds of IHL experts and the interpretation of the same in the minds of
belligerents.

122

While Betcy identifies this as a potential explanation for continuing

violations, he unfortunately does not propose any solutions to resolve the discrepancy in
interpretation.
Michael Schmitt, in his article, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century
Warfare,”

123

also gives an in-depth examination of the requirement to distinguish

between civilian and military. Beginning with an analysis of the current state of the
principle, Schmitt then proceeds to examine the effects growing economic and
technological disparity, religious and ethnic discord, the increasingly blurred lines
between military and civilian, and the development of information acquisition and
dissemination.
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On the whole, Schmitt determines these trends pose a threat to the

principle of discrimination as they tend to increase the desire, and ability perhaps, to
broaden the definition of valid targets and decrease the incentive to protect the
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humanitarian aspects of the law.

125

In an effort to avoid or limit the negative direction in

which Schmitt predicts these trends are leading, Schmitt advocates in favour of
strengthening the role of international organizations and coalitions of States in enforcing
humanitarian standards, arms control and an overall limiting of the universe of legal
targets.

126

Schmitt’s conclusion that limiting the universe of legal targets would help

protect the principle and the humanitarian aspects of the law of armed conflict is very
persuasive. Unfortunately, he does not propose any specific means by which to limit the
universe of legal targets.
The trend in these articles is an examination of IHL from a very positivist
perspective. This is also the case in an article by Nobuo Hayashi, “Requirements of
Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal
Law”.
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This article provides a thoroughly positivist examination of military necessity in

IHL and international criminal law. It isolates the role of military necessity as an
exception to certain specific rules of IHL prohibiting certain actions when those actions
are required to attain a military objective. While the work of Betcy and Schmitt tends to
focus on the civilian costs of violations of the discrimination principle, Hayashi focuses
on the destruction of civilian property. While there is potential to consider the
environment as a civilian object, as discussed by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise
Doswald-Beck in the ICRC’s study on customary IHL,
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Hayashi does not address the

potential consideration of the environment, instead focusing on tangible property such as
buildings, vehicles, etc.
While the above articles provide a traditional and very useful analysis of law, they
fail to appreciate the many other powerful sources and tools of law. There is a tendency
towards overemphasizing conventional laws while underappreciating customary law,
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norms, and principles. This is why Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck’s
Customary Humanitarian Law Vol I: Rules, done for the ICRC, is such an important
resource when examining IHL. Customary IHL is a valid source of international law just
as conventions are, as demonstrated by Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, which lists the
most authoritative sources of public international law.

129

The ICRC’s study is the most

thorough and extensive study of state practice and opinio juris conducted by a wellestablished and well-respected body, and only the holding of the ICJ that something is a
customary law of war would be more authoritative and conclusive.
As can be seen, there is a strong body of academic literature addressing the
protection of civilians in armed conflict, though quite often suggestions on how to
improve these protections are weak or lacking. Meanwhile, there is also a body of
literature which addresses the protection of the environment in armed conflict. In his
PhD dissertation, “Legal perspectives for the protection of the environment against the
effects of military activities during international armed conflict,” Mansour JabbariGharabagh examines the protection of the environment in armed conflict.
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He explores

criticisms of existing IHL laws for the protection of the environment and proposes ways
to modify them in order to provide more effective environmental protection during
conflicts.
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While he examines both IHL and environmental law, his analysis of these

bodies of law is separate and does not really attempt to join them as a means of
improving environmental protection in armed conflict. Meanwhile, his analysis of
environmental law is limited and relies primarily on conventions,
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the many important principles such as the precautionary principle, which could help
create a legal understanding of environmental protection in armed conflicts. Importantly,
Jabbari-Gharabagh looks at the environment from an ecocentric perspective, evaluating
the importance of protection based on the intrinsic value of the environment as opposed
to a more anthropocentric valuation.

133

Ultimately, Jabbari-Gharabagh advocates creating

an international war crime for “crimes against nature”.

134

While this is a novel and

interesting approach to improving protections, he fails to analyze the feasibility of using
this approach, which would require state consensus to create a new international crime.
Karen Hulme, in her piece, “A Darker Shade of Green: Is it Time to Ecocentrise
the Laws of War?,” also focus on the importance of a more ecocentric approach to
environmental protections in armed conflicts.

135

While explaining ecocentrism and

ecosystems, she relies on environmental law, but when she shifts to discussing
environmental protection in conflicts she abandons environmental law and relies almost
entirely on existing IHL.
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While her suggestion of increasing protections for the

environment for its intrinsic value is an important one with much potential,

137

she makes

the same error many other scholars do by failing to draw upon environmental law as a
solution or aid to improving these protections in IHL.
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The environmental problems posed by armed conflict are examined by Onitas Das
in her article, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Sustainable Development,”

138

which

provides a good discussion of the environmental impacts of war before, during, and after
conflicts.

139

While her suggestion of the need for more ‘sustainable development

friendly’ war

140

is of great merit, she does not go into great detail on how to achieve this,

but it certainly an idea worth exploring further. This suggestion is worthy of further
exploration since sustainable development provides an important link between the
environment and conflict (one that will be discussed later in this thesis) as well as helping
to encompass the importance of ensuring long-term interests, both human and
environmental, are considered in conflict.
With Das’ piece we do see efforts to bridge the gap between the bodies of IHL
and environmental law. This bridging of these two fields of law is also seen in
“International law protecting the environment during armed conflict: gaps and
opportunities,” an article for the ICRC by Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond,
and David Jensen.
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Bothe et al. identify three key deficiencies with regards to existing

environmental protections in IHL: the definition of damage to the environment is both
too restrictive and too unclear; the protection of elements of the environment as civilian
objects is rife with legal uncertainties; and, the application of the principle of
proportionality is problematic in cases where harm to the environment constitutes
‘collateral damage’.

142

Having identified these deficiencies, the authors go on to discuss

the possibilities of applying international environmental law in armed conflicts with a
specific look at customary law and soft law.
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Their focus, however, is the potential
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incorporation of principles of environmental law to improve the protection of the
environment, once again failing to appreciate the connection between the environment
and civilian protection. While they are insightful in their approach, which seeks to bridge
the gap between IHL and environmental law in armed conflicts, their conception is
incomplete for its failure to include the risks to civilians that could also benefit from
closing the gap between these bodies of law.
An approach to IHL and environmental law which more closely links to two
bodies of law can be seen in Lesley Wexler’s article, “Limiting the Precautionary
Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty,” in which she
examines the potential use of the environmental law precautionary principle in a military
context, referring to it as the military precautionary principle.

144

While she provides an

example of applying a principle of environmental law in the military context, she restricts
her scope to focus on employing it solely on weapons as a weapon-by-weapon evaluation
to determine away from the battlefield at the weapon production stage whether a weapon
is or should be legal.

145

Ultimately, Wexler concludes that the use of the military

precautionary principle may lead to perverse environmental prioritization in the military
context. For example, she suggests it will disadvantage new technologies and fail to
consider that alternatives may in fact pose greater risks that the weapon under
consideration.
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In particular she compares tungsten rounds as an alternative to depleted

uranium weapons and suggests they pose many of the same risks.

147

She is concerned

that rejecting a particular weapon based on the precautionary principle fails to consider
that the alternatives may in fact be worse,

148

but she fails to explain why these

alternatives themselves would not be subject to the same principled evaluations. Wexler
does not delve into detail about the specific environmental or health problems involved.
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While her approach to considering principles of environmental law in the context of
military operations is particularly interesting because it is an approach that many other
scholars have not yet embraced, her limited approach seems too narrow and fails to
appreciate the fact that often a weapon system may be problematic in certain contexts and
not in other and, therefore, to evaluate a weapon outside of a particular context is
unrealistic.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the current status of protections for civilians and the
environment in armed conflicts. It has outlined the well-established principles of
distinction between civilian and military, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, the
limitation on the permissible means of warfare, precaution and proportionality. While
these provisions and customs protect civilians, they also protect the environment
indirectly as a civilian object. The environment is also protected directly under
international humanitarian law. Despite extensive protections which require that the
dictates of humanity receive proper consideration alongside military necessity, there
appears to be a gap in international humanitarian law which allows states to carry out
attacks which appear to be excessively damaging to civilians and the environment. Two
such examples were outlined in this chapter: the use of cluster munitions in NATO
bombings in Kosovo and the use of depleted uranium weapons by Coalition forces in
Iraq.
This chapter also provided a literature review which demonstrates that there is
strong research on the plight of civilians in armed conflict as well as the risks to the
environment, but they are rarely considered in tandem. This is a curious gap in the
academic literature. The environment is a constant through all times, space, geographic
and conflict contexts. Whether there is human life in the vicinity or not, the environment
is nonetheless present. Therefore, when civilians are present, inevitably and inextricably
both human and natural environments comingle. People depend on a healthy environment
to ensure their own health, to provide space to live, conduct business, grow food, provide
water and other essentials of life. Given the interdependence of humans and the
environment, a risk posed to one will pose a risk to the other. While the potential to
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improve the application of existing IHL by bridging the gap between IHL and
environmental law is hinted at in some of the works discussed above, there is greater
scope for this potential than has been addressed in existing academic literature. As Bothe
et al. note,
the detailed norms, standards, approaches, and mechanisms found
in international environmental law might also help to clarify and
extend basic principles of IHL to prevent, address, or assess
liability for environmental damage incurred during armed
149
conflict.
This should be extended to include preventing and addressing violations of civilian
immunity, drawing on environmental law to address violations of the protections
provided for civilians and the environment in armed conflicts because the issues are so
interconnected. Environmental law is also an area of law that considers not only harms to
the natural environment, but also harms to the human environment. It is an area of law
that, due to the natural evolution of scientific knowledge, is familiar with considering
scientific uncertainty in decision-making processes. Environmental law is also an
appropriate area of law from which to draw as it is accustomed to addressing not only
immediate harms but also long-term harms. It therefore provides a means of considering
a broader and more accurate temporal span for the harms that must be considered, such as
civilian health and environmental and ecological consequences.
This thesis attempts to close the gap between IHL and environmental law through
the use of principles of environmental law as a means to narrow the opportunity in
military assessment of justifying actions which threaten civilian immunity and
environmental protections under the banner of military necessity or by excusing them
based on scientific uncertainty. The use of indiscriminate weapons with high failure rates,
or associated with great scientific uncertainty, and significant potential for long-term
lasting harm to both human and natural environments is not being adequately considered
in weapon and target selection. If current IHL provides inadequate protections, perhaps
what is required is a new approach which better addresses risks to health and the
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environment, which encompasses approaches to scientific uncertainty, and includes both
short-term and long-term appraisals of risks and consequences. This thesis suggests that
principles of environmental law are the tool that will aid the application of existing IHL
by clarifying decision-making and limiting the space in which military necessity and/or
scientific uncertainty can be relied on to justify actions which violate protections for
civilians and the environment.
The next chapter will now turn to the sources of international law. In particular, it
will provide an in-depth examination of general principles of international law: their
identification, functions, and importance in international law. It will demonstrate the
important role general principles can play and establish how principles of environment
law can be of use in other areas of law, not simply international environmental law.
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Chapter 3
3

The Power of Principles: General Principles of
International Law

3.1 Introduction
While Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ]

150

provides the sources of international law upon which the ICJ can rely to resolve cases
before it, the sources listed in this Article are also relied upon much more broadly as
demonstrative of international law. Article 38(1)(a) list conventions, or treaties, as
sources of international law, while Article 38(1)(b) refers to customary law, arising out of
general practice and opinio juris. Article 38(1)(c) cites the general principles of law as
recognized by civilized nations as sources of international law. Meanwhile, Article
38(1)(d) refers to subsidiary sources which can be relied upon, specifically “judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
151

nations”.

The focus of this chapter is not the first two oft-discussed and widely

understood sources of convention and custom, nor the subsidiary sources of judicial
decisions and academic writing. Rather, the focus of this chapter is on general principles
of law.
Article 38(1)(c) lists “the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” as a source of international law. The inclusion of general principles here is not
only distinct from conventional and customary law but it is also, importantly, distinct
from the subsidiary sources referred to in 38(1)(d). However, as will be discussed later in
this chapter, this separation from the specifically referenced “subsidiary” sources has not
necessarily resolved the question of where general principles fall in the hierarchy of
sources of international law, assuming there is a hierarchy at all.
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This chapter will take a closer look at this source of international law, beginning
first with an attempt to define “principles” or at least examine the different ways in which
the term has been used and defined. Three sources of general principles are discussed:
national legal systems, the law itself, and the international legal system. Christopher
Ford’s comparativist and categoricist approaches to identifying general principles are also
examined. Next, I will examine the different functions general principles have been put to
in international law both in judicial decisions and in academic work. I categorize these
functions into four categories: (1) a unification function; (2) a gap-filling function; (3) an
interpretive function; and, (4) a development function. Each of these functions is
examined in turn. The relationship between custom and general principles will be
explored as well as the question of hierarchy of sources of international law. Finally, the
argument that principles are soft law, or non-binding, is explored.
It must be noted at the outset that the term ‘principle’ is used in a multitude of
contexts by international legal commentators. At times they are indeed referring to
general principles of international law, the source recognized by Article 38(1)(c) of the
ICJ Statute. Other times, they may be referring to principles which are either not general
or not law. This chapter focuses on the former, general principles of international law as a
source of international law emanating from Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.

3.2 Defining Principles of International Law
There is no one source which clearly and completely defines what is meant by the
phrase “general principles of law”.
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In fact, how to define and identify such principles

has long been a matter of practical and academic disagreement and debate.
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For

example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s [ICTY’s]
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decision in Kupreskic,

154

refers to general principles in three different ways within one

paragraph: “general principles of international criminal law”, “general principles of
criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world”, and “general principles of
law consonant with the basic requirements of international justice.”

155

As Gideon Boas

notes, “the reference to the three forms of general principles does not facilitate any
comprehension of their meaning or relationship with the ‘general principles of law’ as it
is enshrined as a source of international law in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.”

156

The

International Court of Justice [ICJ] has also been vague, or avoided altogether, defining
“principles” or providing insight in how to identify them.

157

Even where scholars attempt

to define “general principles”, their definitions are, as Cherif Bassiouni notes, “so general
and self-evident that they add little to the plain meaning of the very words they intend to
define.”

158

These include expressions such as “cardinal principles of the legal system”,

“core of legal ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems”, and “manifestation
of the universal legal conscience certified by the law of civilized States.”

159

Despite this

lack of agreement and clarity on general principles, there are, nonetheless, key elements
and important concepts that can be drawn from the abundance of discourse in existence
on the subject.

3.3 Toward a Basic Definition of General Principles
Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute refers to “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations”.
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The term “civilized” is more or less ignored in

modern considerations of the source, a no longer acceptable relic of past colonial
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161

mindsets.

Instead, it is more often thought of as “general principles of law recognized

by the community of nations”.

162

Still, the language gives little indication as to where or

how these principles should be defined or identified. Scholars, such as the late Oscar
Schachter, provide some basic characteristics of general principles.

163

Rather than

provide a single definition of general principles, he contrasts the “generality and
abstractness” of principles to the “definiteness” of legal rules.

164

He states that principles

“have a wide range of application” and that they naturally give way, when more than one
principle applies to a situation, to a weighing and balancing to find the specific
165

solution.

According to Raz, “[p]rinciples, because they prescribe highly unspecified

acts, tend to be more vague and less certain than rules.”

166

This is, in fact, a benefit of

principles because it allows for a broader range of application and to “leave room for
varying interpretation”.

167

This generality of principles of international law allows room

to be adapted for more specific contexts in different situations and different areas of law,
as well as to develop more specific content in domestic legal systems.
Next, is how to recognize a general principle and how much recognition from
states is required for their existence. Once again, we encounter a certain amount of
ambiguity because, as Bassiouni notes, “no quantitative or numerical test for States
having such a ‘principle’ has ever been established.”

168

What is clear is that, while it

must exist in multiple states, it “does not have to meet the test of ‘universal
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acceptance’”.

169

The “universal acceptance” requirement or test has been rejected by the

ICJ in both the South West Africa Cases

170

and the North Sea Continental Shelf case.

171

This rejection was articulated most clearly in the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in
the South West Africa Cases when he states, “[t]he recognition of a principle by civilized
nations … does not mean recognition by all civilized nations”.

172

For Schachter, these principles are ones “intrinsic to the idea of law”, required by
“the nature of human beings”, or necessitated by the structure of international society.”

173

Bassiouni suggests that general principles are “expressions of other unperfected sources
of international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ [Permanent Court of
International Justice, the predecessor to the ICJ] and ICJ; namely, conventions, customs,
writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ.”

174

For Bassiouni, these

unperfected sources, for instance, “when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or
consistent practice, or when States express opinio juris without any supportive practice”
can “singularly or cumulatively with others, may possibly be considered to be
expressions of a given principle. “
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This close link between general principles and other sources of international law,
such as treaty and custom, can also be seen in the treatment of general principles by the
ICJ. At times, the ICJ has dealt with general principles in a manner in which the line
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between principle and custom is not easily distinguished.

176

For example, in the ICJ’s

judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the court stated “certain basic legal
notions which […] have from the beginning reflected the opinio juris in the matter of
delimitation; those principles being that delimitation must be the object of agreement
between the States concerned, and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance
177

with equitable principles.”

Here, the ICJ both links equity to opinio juris, suggesting it

has the nature of custom, while also referring to ‘equitable principles’. Meanwhile, in
other cases, the ICJ more clearly separates custom from principles. This can be seen in
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, where this time on the subject of equity the ICJ
explicitly stated that “legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as
law”.

178

Bassiouni notes that “some principles that are not encompassed in customary

law may be implicated by the term "General Principles."
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This suggests that while

sometimes a general principle will also be customary law, at other times a general
principle will merely be a general principle and not also customary. Boas suggests two
possible solutions to this quandary: that such principles are located or recognized by the
national legal systems of states; or, that, quite separate from domestic legal systems, they
are “derived directly from international legal relations and legal relations generally.”
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In fact there are several different proposed ways of identifying general principles and
these are examined more closely below.
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3.3.1 Derived from National Laws
One of the most commonly discussed interpretations of general principles posits
that they originate from the domestic law of states. Sean Murphy states that it “can mean
principles that exist in the national laws of states worldwide.”181 However, he goes on to
note that the language found in Article 38(1)(c) – general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations – “does not actually refer to national law.”182 Boas claims there are two
sources for general principles, only one of which is principles “recognized by the
domestic legal systems of the world.”183 The other is that “[g]eneral principles may be
derived from international legal relations and legal relations generally.”

184

Bassiouni also

sees two avenues for identifying general principles, only the first of which is “expressions
of national legal systems”.185 The other is that they are “expressions of other unperfected
sources of international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ and ICJ; namely,
conventions, customs, writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ.”

186

These scholars are not alone in their belief that national legal systems are a source
of general principles. Bassiouni cites to many other scholars who identify general
principles as coming from domestic legal systems. General principles are, according to
Verzijl, “fundamental to every well-ordered society”187, while Favre, as cited by
Lammers, defines them as “norms underlying national legal orders”188. Ultimately,
Bassiouni asserts that there seems to be at least some consensus among scholars that
principles “are found in the underlying or posited principles or postulates of national
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legal systems”, but, critically, this sentence does not end there. It is followed by the
words “or of international law.”

189

This addition by Bassiouni recognizes the problem of solely identifying general
principles from national legal systems, also recognized by Murphy and Ford. Ford raises
the problem of unsuitability. It is not always suitable to adopt principles from a particular
legal context into another, let alone from domestic law to international law and viceversa.

190

In fact, Ford suggests that “[d]irect translation between domestic and

international jurisprudence may well do violence to the real values and policies served by
principles ostensibly accepted at both levels.”

191

It is not so much that general principles

can never, or should never, be found in domestic legal systems, but rather that “they
should not reflexively be borrowed ‘after a census of domestic systems.’”

192

Ultimately,

the key is, as Murphy notes, the language of Article 38(1)(c), which requires recognition
of the principles by nations, not that the source of the principles be the domestic laws of
the nations themselves.
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3.3.2 Intrinsic to the Idea of Law
Another potential interpretation of general principles sees them as “principles
194

intrinsic to the idea of law.”

That is, these principles are inherent to the very

conceptions of justice or fairness.
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An example of this can be seen in the PCIJ’s

judgment in the River Meuse case, wherein the court justified its application of the
principles of equity under general principles of law.
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principles’ can also be seen in the ICTY’s judgment of the Kupreskic case, in which the
Tribunal refers to “general principles of law consonant with the basic requirements of
international justice.”

197

As noted earlier, the tribunal used the term ‘general principles’

in two additional ways, which indicates that, while principles may be found in the very
idea of law itself, they may also be drawn from other sources.
Nonetheless, there is further support for sourcing (at least some) general
principles in the basic nature of law itself. Frances Jalet’s definition of general principles
sees them as “principles that constitute that unformulated reservoir of basic legal
concepts universal in application, which exist independently of the institutions of any
particular country and form the irreducible essence of all legal systems.”

198

Her

definition is interesting in that, while it embraces general principles as being intrinsic to
law by reference to the “irreducible essence of all legal systems”, it also seems to reject
the proposition discussed above, which states that general principles are to be found
inside domestic law.

3.3.3 Derived from the International Legal System
Finally, an interpretation of general principles suggests that they are derived from
international law itself. As Boas states, they “may be derived directly from international
legal relations and legal relations generally.”

199

By this, Boas is referring to the many

interpretive principles employed by international courts, such as lex specialis derogate
legi generali (special laws prevail over general laws). He is also referring to
“[f]oundational principles of the international community – such as the sovereign
equality of states”.

200

This understanding of general principles can also be seen in the

Kupreskic case as the ICTY refers to “general principles of international criminal
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law”.

201

It is also inherent in Bassiouni’s definition of general principles as “expressions

of other unperfected sources of international law”.

202

This approach is also evidenced by

the fact that international courts have drawn upon “State conduct, policies, practices, and
pronouncements at the international level, which may be different from domestic legal
principles” to identify general principles of law.

203

This understanding of general

principles also emphasizes the usefulness of principles in the articulation of norms by
courts and the “values of the ‘legal community’”.

204

As Ford elaborates, it is general

principles that allow courts to “[articulate] hitherto unexpressed international legal
205

norms”.

3.4 Comparativist or Categoricist Approaches to Identifying
General Principles
Christopher Ford describes two different approaches for the identification of
general principles: the comparativist approach and the categoricist approach. He
describes the comparativist approach as being essentially “an international jurist’s
invitation to undertake a colossal comparative-law project.”

206

Under this approach, for

something to be a general principle, it would need to be “recognized in substance by all
the main systems of law”.

207

This approach is very much in line with the approach which

sees principles as being derived from national legal systems. This approach sees general
principles identified after a thorough survey of the domestic legal systems and finding the
same principle expressed in many different legal systems.
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On the other hand, under the categoricist approach, principles are “seen to be
‘general’ by virtue of being inherent to the very idea of law.”

209

The “real test [is] not

universal domestic consensus but a sort of transcendental propriety.”

210

What general

principles truly are, by categoricist standards, are “general propositions underlying the
various rules of law which express the essential qualities of juridical truth itself”.

211

It is plain to see that the comparativist and categoricist approaches differ
considerably in their understanding of general principles and neither approach is ideal.
As Ford observes, the comparativist approach is very cumbersome with its requirement
of an extensive examination of all domestic legal systems.

212

At the same time, the

categoricist approach can be criticized for “[placing] itself solely at the mercy of the
decision maker.”

213

Ford advocates instead for a balancing of the two approaches. This

comparative-categorical approach would still allow for “judicial discretion in interpreting
values and applying norms”,

214

but might also employ “comparative methods to evaluate

the genuine character of candidate principles and to act as something of a ‘reality check’
on the exercise of judicial discretion.”

215

Nonetheless, Ford warns against strict adoption

of domestic principles directly into international legal contexts.

216

Ultimately, Ford

concludes that “[w]hile general principles doctrine forswears rigid reliance upon
comparative study for the derivation of general principles, its retention of comparativist
217

guideposts may be an important tool”.
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Article 38(1)(c) definitively indicates that general principles are indeed a source
of international law. Unfortunately, it does not provide a clear answer as to how to define
or identify these principles. Perhaps this is not so problematic when the inherent general
and abstract nature of these principles is considered, along with their functions in
international law. The fact is, international courts draw principles from all three of the
above discussed areas: national law, the idea of law itself, and international law.
Oftentimes, a principle can be found in more than one or even all of these different areas.
This flexibility is reflective of the inherent flexibility of the principles themselves.

3.5 The Role of General Principles in International Law
Just as there are many means of identifying general principles, there are also
many methods of categorizing the functions that they serve in international law. For the
purpose of this thesis, it will be proposed that general principles perform four key
functions:
(1) A unification function: general principles act as a counterforce against the
fragmentation of international law;
(2) A gap-filling function: where lacunae arise in international law, general
principles can act to fill the gap;
(3) An interpretive function: general principles aid in the interpretation of
international law; and
(4) A development function: general principles aid in the development of
218
international law.
Like the different origins of general principles, often a principle can perform a different
function depending on the context, or can perform multiple functions at the same time.
These four functions are examined in greater detail below.
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3.5.1 Unification Function
While critics of international law often lament its decentralized nature with no one
central authority to control all, this is not quite the same issue that is meant when
discussing the increasing fragmentation of the international legal system. Fragmentation,
in this context, as defined by the International Law Commission [ILC] in its study on the
matter, is “the splitting up of the law into highly specialized ‘boxes’ that claim relative
autonomy from each other and from the general law.”

219

Fragmentation is the result of

the creation of “such specialist systems as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’,
‘environmental law’ […] – each possessing their own principles and institutions.”

220

Prost describes it as a process of expansion, densification and diversification to a point at
which “frames and margins are blurred, where legal spaces overlap and conflict with each
other, [and] a network with a plurality of voices, lacking a master plan or blueprint” is
created.

221

Splitting up areas of specialization is common practice in domestic systems. In
Canada, the United States, Great Britain and many other countries, there exist individual
ministries dealing with trade, the environment, justice, and so on with a central
government or governments to oversee the overall process. However, in the international
legal system, “the conceptual-doctrinal consistency, the clear hierarchy of norms and the
effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within the nation-states, is lacking.”

222

The big concern fragmentation presents is the “danger of conflicting and incompatible
rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional practices.”

223

And the critical question it
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raises, as the ILC describes in its study, is “[h]ow should the relationship between such
[specialized] ‘boxes’ be conceived?”

224

To understand how general principles can help

address the concerns of fragmentation, it is useful to turn to the late Oscar Schachter’s
analogy of the international legal system to a system of towns, villages, paths and
highways, as well as to look at the additional functions of general principles which are
also important for fulfilling the unification function.

225

Schachter’s analogy compares international law to a large terrain. On this terrain,
or map, a specialized branch of law is represented by a village or town, wherein they
focus on their own affairs. There are narrow paths that run between these towns and
villages, but they are used infrequently. Instead, covering the entire map are
“superhighways, the connecting links, which in the metaphor convey the general
principles and concepts.”

226

Schachter then proceeds to elaborate on how the actors on

this map relate to the different elements of the terrain. He says:
Those who travel on the highways are generally only dimly aware
of the lively activities in the towns and villages. Those who
remain only in the local communities immersed in their
specialties tend to lose sight of the interconnections and
227
coherence of the larger whole.
Schachter goes on to emphasize the importance of the superhighways, of general
principles and concepts, because international law “is much more than a congery of
separate legal régimes in particular fields. Just as facts become meaningful when they are
linked to ideas and norms, so do ideas and norms gather strength as they become part of a
coherent interrelated system.”

228

For Schacter, it is these general principles and concepts

that give the system unity. He states that “[w]e need to relate concepts to practice and
thus give them content. We need to relate practices to concepts in order to give practice
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meaning and direction.”

229

Principles and concepts are therefore an essential part of

international law without which there can be no meaning and direction for practice.
Principles and concepts are the important links uniting the growing number of specialized
fields of law. Since, according to Martti Koskenniemi, there “[is] no meta-regime” in
international law ,

230

general principles and concepts can be used to increase our

understanding and connect these different fields, as Schachter suggests.

231

The precise

way in which general principles can play a role in increasing our understanding can be
seen through the other three functions.

3.5.2 Gap-Filling Function
General principles “perform a gap-filling function where there is no customary or
treaty law on the issue, or where a principle is required to decide which hierarchically
equal norm should prevail in the event of a clash.”

232

In doing so, general principles

“prevent[s] decision-makers from either pronouncing a non liquet (failure to decide) or,
worse, deciding the issue according to their personal whim.”

233

This is one of the most

common functions of general principles, second only perhaps to the interpretive function.
Additionally, general principles can perform a gap-filling function to the point of being
pseudo-decision-makers where there is a need to decide a conflict between norms.

234

Bassiouni suggests that general principles may fill gaps on “a more objective basis than
the value-laden natural law philosophy espoused by some Continental and American
scholars.
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In fact, the logical application of general principles to fill gaps in customary
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and treaty law suggests it is “a source of law that overreaches other positive sources of
international law, and eventually supersedes it.”

236

Since gaps in positive international law do exist, there is need for something to fill
these gaps, and general principles are the logical choice for that job. In fact, Bassiouni
states, “[t]hat is why this source of law was included in article 38 of both the PCIJ and the
ICJ Statutes.

237

According to Ford, “[a]t the time the Statute of the PCIJ was drafted in

1920, the idea that international tribunals could invoke general principles in order to fill
gaps was already well established in certain international contexts.”
the ICJ Statute simply carried on this practice.

239

238

Article 38(1)(c) of

Article 38(1)(c) is, in Ford’s words, “an

express textual warrant for gap-filling judicial discretion.”

240

This gap-filling function is

ultimately articulated by the ICJ in the Right of Passage case, in which Judge Fernandes,
in his dissenting opinion, stated that “[i]t frequently happens that a decision given on the
basis of a particular or general convention or of a custom requires recourse to the general
principles … A court will have recourse to those principles to fill gaps in the
conventional rules, or to interpret them.”

241

The ICJ did just that in the Corfu Channel

case, where it relied upon a principle of the admissibility of indirect evidence to interpret
the evidence admissible by Great Britain on the knowledge and responsibility of Albania
for laying mines in the Corfu channel.
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3.5.3 Interpretive Function
The interpretive function is the most commonly employed use of general
principles and, according to Bassiouni, “the one that is evidently the most needed and
useful”.

243

Raz concurs that this function is “of the utmost importance since it is a crucial

device for ensuring coherence of purpose among various laws bearing on the same
subject.”

244

As such, it is also an important means of responding to fragmentation and

performing the unification function of general principles. Though the “extent to which
one can resort to ‘General Principles’ for interpretive purposes has never been
established”

245

, these principles have nonetheless “been primarily used to clarify and

interpret international law.”

246

Some general principles are specifically interpretive in nature, such as the
principle which dictates that special laws prevail over general ones (lex specialis
derogate legi generali).

247

Meanwhile other principles, such as the general principle of

respect for human dignity, identified by the ICTY in the Furundzija case as “the basic
underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and
human rights” was employed by that court to help interpret the international laws relating
to rape.

248

This use of general principles in Furundzija exemplifies Bassiouni’s assertion

that “[t]hey are useful for interpreting words not susceptible to an ordinary or common
meaning interpretation”.

249

243

Bassiouni, supra note 152 at 776.

244

Raz, supra note 166 at 840.

245

Bassiouni, supra note 152 at 776.

246

Bassiouni, ibid at 776.

247

Boas, supra note 17 at 107.

248

Prosecutor v Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40276a8a4.html at 183. [hereinafter Furundzija]
249

Bassiouni, supra note 152 at 800.

62
Equally important when considering the interpretation of international law is the
250

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT].

Article 31(3) of the VCLT

requires subsequent agreements, practices and rules of international law to be taken into
account when interpreting a treaty.251 The ILC Study on Fragmentation devoted some
time to discussing Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which reads as follows:
There shall be taken into account together with the context:
… (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
252
the relations between the parties.
The ILC refer to this article as an expression of a principle it calls the principle of
“systemic integration”. The principle “points to the need to take into account the
normative environment [of the obligations in question] more widely.”

253

The aim is to

ensure that provisions are interpreted “so as to see the rules in view of some
comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at
the cost of less important objectives.”

254

This systemic nature of international law,

integral to both interpretation and the unification of international law, can be anchored on
this provision of the VCLT.

255

It is important to note that, though the provision “refers to

rules of international law in general, the words cover all the sources of international law,
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including custom, general principles, and, where applicable, other treaties”.

256

While, at

first glance, there may seem to be confusion by the use of the term “rules”, in the
following sentence the ILC clarifies that this is inclusive of custom and general
257

principles, not merely rules founded in conventions.

The ILC Study further elaborates

that the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations perform a rather
similar task in locating the treaty provision within a principled framework”.

258

Within a fragmented international legal system consisting of so many specialized
institutions, law must not be employed in isolation “only as an instrument for attaining
regime-objectives.”

259

Rather, “law is also about protecting rights and enforcing

obligations, above all rights and obligations that have a backing in something like a
general, public interest.”

260

The ILC emphasizes that “[w]ithout the principle of

‘systemic integration’ it would be impossible to give expression to and to keep alive, any
sense of common good of humankind, not reducible to the good of any particular
institution or ‘regime’.”

261

The interpretation, and often by association the unification,

functions of general principles are crucial to the exercise of international law and the
preservation of the coherence of international law.

3.5.4 Development Function
The final function of general principles is the development function, or as
Bassiouni refers to it, the “growth function”.
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Essentially, general principles play a role

in the development of international law. Bassiouni, citing James Brierly, describes the
function as “an authoritative recognition of a dynamic element in international law and of
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the creative function of the courts which administer it.”

263

Bassiouni also notes that many

scholars see this “underlying role of ‘General Principles’ as necessary to the development
of international law.”

264

The reasoning behind this necessity is that “it would be stifling

not to inject into the sources of any legal system the capability of growth and
development.”

265

This function of general principles therefore serves to provide a certain

amount of dynamism in the operation of international law.
The development function provides for the possibility that existing general
principles could form the basis for creating new rules of international law.

266

Bassiouni

goes so far as to say that the “development of new norms of conventional and customary
law required the existence of ‘General Principles.’”

267

Given the importance of this

dynamism and evolution of international law, Bassiouni “assume[s] that the framers of
both the PCIJ and ICJ Statutes anticipated the prospective need for evolution and change
in the development of international law – as evidenced by […] article 38(1)(c).”

268

Ford

goes further, stating that the “drafters of Article 38 deliberately empowered future Courts
‘to develop and refine the principles of international jurisprudence.’”

269

The ICTY’s use of general principles in Furundzija, discussed above, is not only
an example of the interpretive function of general principles but also an example of its
development function. The Tribunal used the general principle of human dignity not only
to interpret existing customary law on rape but also to develop the definition of rape in
international law.
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constitute rape.

271

The use of general principles allowed for continued development of

international law.

3.6 Custom or Principle?: The Relationship between
Custom and General Principles
There is a strong relationship between customary law and general principles. The
relationship is so strong that the line between them is sometimes difficult to
distinguish.

272

In fact, some general principles are both general principles and rules of

customary international law at the same time.

273

One such example provided by Boas is

the rule/general principle of pacta sunt servanda (the principle that agreements must be
274

kept).

Furthermore, the concept of jus cogens or non-derogable principles, “is

premised on the existence of a hierarchy of ‘General Principles.’”

275

Another link between custom and principles is that general principles can play a
role in the formation of customary international law. A general principle may provide
evidence of custom through its consistent and/or widespread practice.

276

General

principles and custom can also both “apply to states that have not tacitly agreed to those
particular norms” by virtue of the fact that their validity and binding nature “is a product
of the common will of the international community”.

277

Principles and custom are both

evolutionary sources, the weight and influence of which develop over time.
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A key distinction between custom and principles, however, is that when custom is
not perfected, “such as when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or consistent
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practice, or when States express opinio juris without any supportive practice”, the
practice does not have the binding force of customary law, but the practice may
nonetheless be representative of a general principle of international law.

279

Ultimately,

while general principles and customary international law may sometimes overlap, they
both also play distinct and very important roles in the operation of international law.

3.7 Hierarchy of Sources of International Law
Crucial to understanding the role of general principles in international law is not
simply knowing how to identify them and how they function, but also knowing their
weight and status within the realm of different sources of international law. Article 38(1)
lists conventions, custom, general principles, judicial decisions and the writings of
publicists as sources of international law. Based on the wording of the Article, the natural
interpretation would be that conventions, custom and general principles are ‘primary’
sources of international law, this inference being drawn from the fact that the Article
expressly states that judicial decisions and the writings of publicists are ‘subsidiary’
sources.

280

In spite of what seems to be quite clear language, there exists a sense that

treaty and custom are actually hierarchically superior to general principles.

281

On the

other hand, Boas suggests that “the gap-filling and tie-breaking function of general
principles only indicates that this formal source operates in a different way and in a
different sphere from that of treaty and custom”, rather than an hierarchically inferior
fashion.

282

Bassiouni also dismisses the suggestion that general principles are

hierarchically inferior to custom and convention, noting that “in the context of legislative
intent, it becomes evident that the drafters of article 38 of the PCIJ Statute never intended
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to create a hierarchy of sources.”

283

Rather, the drafters consciously omitted the words

“in the order following” from the language of the Article.

284

As the ILC notes in its Study on Fragmentation, “[t]here is no formal hierarchy
between the sources of international law”, though it suggested that, nonetheless, there
may be an informal hierarchy between sources.

285

Instinctively, in looking to resolve an

issue, there is a hierarchy, as conventional law is usually considered first, then customary
international law, and then general principles.

286

In reality, the different functions of each

respective source of international law can often allow them to operate in conjunction with
each other or in a symbiotic way. However, as Bassiouni points out, “[t]he choice of
which functions ‘General Principles’ should assume is clearly predicated on whether
‘General Principles’ are deemed a subsidiary or primary source of international law.”

287

As a primary source, general principles “may have a binding legal effect superior to that
of positive normative rules of international law.”

288

On the other hand, as a subsidiary

source, general principles “are only appropriately resorted to for the purposes of
explaining inadequacies in the positive normative law and can also occasionally fill gaps
in these two primary sources.”

289

This question regarding the binding nature of general principles is “well
established and its hierarchical ranking has simply been left to the functional need for
their application in specific cases.”

290

The application by the PCIJ and ICJ in practice has

“been cautious and [they] have often restricted ‘General Principles’ to a limited role that
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some would see as a subsidiary function”.

291

However, and as Bassiouni crucially notes,

“one cannot rely on the caution of the courts as evidence that they intended to place
‘General Principles’ in a subsidiary position to other sources of international law.”

292

Ultimately, there is great strength in the position that general principles are a primary
source based on the language of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.

3.8 General Principles: The Soft Law Argument
As noted above, there are some who feel general principles are more of a
subsidiary, or non-binding, source of international law rather than a primary source equal
in stature to custom and treaty. Proponents of this position argue that treaty and custom
are inherently more representative of the will of states.

293

As such, they feel that these

sources should be prioritized over general principles and general principles should take
on a lesser role entailing merely “explaining inadequacies in the positive normative law
and […] also occasionally fill gaps in these two primary sources.”

294

While the

legitimacy of such claims is questionable, given the above discussion on the hierarchy of
sources, it is nonetheless useful to examine the role of general principles if they are
indeed a lesser or non-binding source of law.
There is an increasing tendency in several areas of law to “place normative
statements and agreements in nonlegally binding or politically instruments such as
declarations, resolutions, and programs of action.”

295

Such non-binding instruments are

commonly referred to as soft law. In actuality “there is no accepted definition of ‘soft
law’, but it usually refers to any international instrument other than a treaty that contains
principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.”
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General principles stated in soft law documents can still be powerful tools of
evidence of existing law, or can be demonstrative of opinio juris or state practice leading
to the formation of new customary law.

297

As Alan Boyle notes, once soft law begins to

interact with binding instruments - for example, in the case of intergenerational equity in
Article 3(1) of the 1992 Climate Change Convention - the non-binding character of soft
law may be lost or altered.

298

This indicates that principles in soft law documents can

evolve into binding norms. Principles expressed in soft law documents can also still play
a very important role based on the influence they can exert on the interpretation,
application and development of other rules of law.

299

For example, Article 31(3) of the

VCLT calls upon such principles to be taken into account when interpreting a treaty.

300

The usefulness of principles in international law expressed in a soft law document
has also been articulated by Susan Marks.

301

Marks comments on how principles

expressed in soft law documents can be useful as tools for the interpretation, application
and articulation of international law.
in existence in international law.

303

302

They can also be used to reinforce trends already

While Marks’ comments center around a proposed

principle of democratic inclusion, they are equally pertinent to the importance and
usefulness of other soft law principles.
Whether general principles are considered binding or non-binding in nature, they
are also widely recognized across cultures and states.304 As well, they often have a strong
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normative content around which non-governmental organizations [NGOs], the public and
states can easily rally. As Alan Boyle notes, “soft law instruments can thus become
vehicles for focusing consensus on rules and principles, and for mobilizing a consistent,
general response on the part of States”.305 As such, even though it seems more likely that
general principles have at least some, if not complete binding force, they can be powerful
tools for the application and interpretation of international law whether they form part of
soft or hard law.

3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the nature of general principles of law as a source found
in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. While there may not be one concise and precise
definition of ‘general principles’, there are certain key characteristics they embody. These
characteristics include: they are more general in nature than custom and convention; they
are abstract; and they do not require universal acceptance. These characteristics lend
themselves to identifying general principles not simply and strictly in one area, such as
the national laws of states, but in multiple areas that also include principles intrinsic to
the very idea of law, and principles found in international law itself. Furthermore, general
principles perform multiple important functions in international law. They help to unify
what seems to be a fragmented system of different specializations; they fill gaps in
existing international law; they help to interpret existing laws; and they help to continue
the growth and development of international law.
With this understanding of general principles in mind, the next chapters will turn
to examining the two principles being used in this thesis: the principle of
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, both principles found in
international environmental and international sustainable development law. This chapter
has demonstrated that general principles of international law can serve many important
functions. They can be extremely useful tools for uniting international law as well as
interpreting and applying international law. This will be of particular importance in the

305

Boyle (2006), supra note 297 at 141.

71
remaining chapters of this thesis because it illustrates how intergenerational equity and
the precautionary principle, as general principles of international law, can have the ability
to influence other areas of law, such as international humanitarian law.
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Chapter 4
4

International Environmental Law: Exploring Sustainable
Development and Intergenerational Equity

4.1 Introduction
This chapter transitions into the realm of international environmental law (IEL). It
begins with an introduction to the field of IEL as well as its important links to sustainable
development. It then explores in some depth a principle of IEL and an integral part of
sustainable development, the principle of intergenerational equity. This principle
considers both long-term and short-term threats and harms. Not only is this relevant in
the realm of environmental law, but also in the realm of human rights, a link that will be
explored in the final part of the chapter.

4.2 International Environmental Law & Sustainable
Development
4.2.1 International Environmental Law
International environmental law (IEL) is a relatively young area of law, growing
out of mounting environmental concerns in the 1960s and evolving and building into
today’s increasingly important body of law.

306

Its primary goal is the protection of the

environment. In protecting the environment, instruments, policies, principles and rules of
IEL focus on a broad range of issues: from health, to the conservation of flora and fauna,
to the ocean, to the atmosphere.
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The protection of the environment touches on a
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myriad of areas because there is little to no action that does not have an effect, to one
degree or another, on some aspect of the environment.

308

Furthermore, “[e]nvironmental

problems present a moving target” because “not only does scientific understanding
develop, [but] environmental problems themselves change as human behaviour and
technology change.”

309

These problems oftentimes will not be contained by the borders

on a map. Many environmental problems have “effects that are widely dispersed and long
term, with long latency periods.”

310

Sometimes these effects are irreversible.

311

It is this nature of environmental problems that IEL seeks to address. The broad,
all-encompassing, transitory, scientifically uncertain, long-lasting and potentially
irreversible nature of environmental problems requires IEL to continue to adapt, adopt
and create its own tools to meet the needs of the environment and humanity. More often
than not, though, it is human needs that are the primary justification for, or reasoning
behind, IEL efforts. As Alan Boyle notes, “[i]nternational environmental law is
essentially anthropocentric rather than radically ecocentric in character.”

312

This

anthropocentric focus means that environmental protections are often based upon human
self-interest and/or cultural, economic or aesthetic needs, uses and benefits of the
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See Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, & Ellen Hey, ‘International Environmental Law: Mapping the
Field’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International
Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 6 [hereinafter Bodansky et al.]; Jaye Ellis
& Stepan Wood, ‘International Environmental Law’ in Benjamin J Richardson & Stepan Wood, eds,
Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2006) 343 at 380
[hereinafter Ellis & Wood]. The definition of ‘environment’ is also a rather complex one, for a more
detailed exploration of the definition see Marie-Louise Larsson, “Legal Definitions of the Environment and
Environmental Damage” (1999) 38 Scandinavian Stud L 155; or for a look at the differing interpretations
of ‘environment’ between the Global North and South see Mickelson, supra note 303.
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Bodansky et al., ibid at 7-8.
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Bodansky et al., ibid at 7.
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Bodansky et al., ibid at 14.
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Alan Boyle, ‘Relationship between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of
International Law’ in in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 125 at 141. [hereinafter Boyle
(2007)]
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environment.

313

However, it must also be noted, that some scholars emphasize an

increasing development in IEL which embraces a more ecocentric approach, valuing and
promoting the protection of the environment for its own intrinsic worth.

314

These tools include both binding treaties and non-binding declarations and
resolutions. An excellent example of the production of both treaties and declarations
came out of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil [Rio Conference]. Both the UN Convention on Biological
Diversity

315

and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)

316

were

opened for signatures at the Rio Conference and are now binding IEL treaties. On the
non-binding side, Agenda 21,

317

dealing with sustainable development, and the Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration),

318

27 principles on

environment and development, were negotiated and produced at the Rio Conference.
While the instruments themselves are non-binding, their content carries much weight,
with many principles contained in them having achieved binding customary law status.

319

313

See Alexander Gillespie, ‘An introduction to ethical considerations in international environmental law’
in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and Panos Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on International
Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 117.
314

See, for example, Bodansky et al., supra note 308 at 15-16.
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Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention), 6 May 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM
818 (1992). [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]
316

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107;
S Treaty Doc No 102-38; UN Doc A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. [hereinafter UNFCCC]
317

Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, 14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 46th Sess,
Agenda Item 21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992), available at http://www.un-documents.net/k-001962.htm.
[hereinafter Agenda 21]
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Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992,A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), online
United Nations website <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm>.
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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For example, the precautionary principle enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as discussed in
Sands et al., supra note 11 at 218; Arie Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 32 [hereinafter Trouwborst]; Joakim Zander, The Application of the
Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010) at 72 [hereinafter Zander]; and, Nicolas de Sadeleer, “The principles of prevention and precaution in
international law: two heads of the same coin?” in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and Panos
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Tools of IEL include instruments produced by states
by experts.

321

320

as well as those produced

As Dupuy notes, “resolutions adopted by experts […], although they are

less authoritative than those negotiated by state delegations[…], can be extremely
influential in legitimizing and shaping successive legal developments.”

322

Furthermore,

“resolutions adopted by states indicate how international law can evolve, whereas those
adopted by experts indicate how international law should evolve.”

323

As with many areas

of law, IEL requires the participation and consent of states as well as the expertise and
opinion of experts in order to provide protection for the environment, to fully consider
the many interests at stake, and to benefit from the different knowledge bases available in
the realm of environmental protection.
While IEL benefits from both binding and non-binding instruments produced by
both states and experts, it lacks “an integrated UN special agency that could serve as an
‘umbrella organization’ for coordinating environmental policies, integrating legislation,
and monitoring implementation.”

324

Given this lack of umbrella organization, Dupuy

suggests that “general customary rules and general principles may act, in part at least, as

Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2010) 182 at 187 [hereinafter De Sadeleer (2010)].
320

These include binding treaties, as well as many non-binding instruments such as Agenda 21, supra note
317, and the Rio Declaration, supra note 318.
321

For example, reports put out by the experts groups of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) or produced by the International Law Association (ILA) or International Law Commission (ILC).
322

Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles’ in Daniel
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 449 at 459. [hereinafter Dupuy]
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Dupuy, ibid.

Dupuy, ibid at 463. Note: the UNEP does not fulfill this role primarily because it is a UN Programme
with limited legal personality and controlled by the UN General Assembly, as opposed to a UN Agency
which are autonomous intergovernmental agencies create through an independent legal instrument. For
further discussion on the differences between UN agencies and UN Programmes see UNEP, “United
Nations Specialised Agencies versus United Nations Programmes” (7 June 2010) available at:
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df. [hereinafter UNEP (2010)]
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compensation for the institutional deficiencies of the system.”

325

Indeed, IEL has a large

number of general rules or principles and they are often the focus of academic discussion.
Sands et al. focus on seven “general rules and principles that have broad, if not
necessarily universal, support and are frequently endorsed in practice.”

326

The general

rules and principles that are the focus of academic discussion are:
(1) the obligation reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, namely, that states have
sovereignty over their natural resources and the responsibility not to cause
transboundary damage;
(2) the principle of preventive action;
(3) the principle of co-operation;
(4) the principle of sustainable development;
(5) the precautionary principle;
(6) the polluter pays principle; and
(7) the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.

327

Ellis and Wood, meanwhile, focus on a non-exhaustive list of nine principles: prevention,
equitable balancing of interests, precaution, common concern of humankind, common but
differentiated obligations, co-operation, prior notice and consultation, prior informed
consent and environmental impact assessments.

328

While there are some specific

principles in common to the lists, others, such as sustainable development in the first list,
incorporates or includes principles from the Ellis and Wood list, such as the equitable
balancing of interests.

325

UNEP (2010), ibid.

326

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 187.
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Sands et al., ibid.
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Ellis & Wood, supra note 308.
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4.2.2 Sustainable Development as Encompassing International
Environmental Law
Many principles of IEL are also encompassed in sustainable development. Ellis
and Wood state that “[i]t is possible to view all the legal principles [listed above] as
segments of a wide, over-arching principle […]: ‘sustainable development’ (or
‘sustainability’).”

329

Sustainable development is most commonly defined by its earliest

definition in the Brundtland Report (1987) by the World Commission on Environment
and Development: “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

330

It seeks to

balance economic and social development with environmental protection, both in the
short- and long-term. Though this basic understanding of sustainable development exists,
it is nonetheless “highly susceptible to varied explanations”

331

considerable uncertainty as to its exact meaning and scope.”

and “[i]t is subject to

332

Also subject to great academic discussion is whether sustainable development is a
body of law unto itself, a mere concept, or a principle. Each possibility receives support
in the academic literature. Sands et al. discuss the “law of sustainable development”

333

,

while French refers to “the notion, the principle – if not now – the mantra of sustainable
development”.

334

For Boyle and Freestone, sustainable development is a “concept”

329

Ellis & Wood, ibid at 373.

330

Brundtland Report, supra note 10 at 8.
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.
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Ulrich Beyerlin, ‘Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law: Policies, Principles,
and Rules’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International
Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 425 at 444. [hereinafter Beyerlin]
332

Vaughan Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in Alan Boyle and David
Freestone, eds, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future
Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 19 at 29. [hereinafter Lowe]
333

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 10.
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Duncan French, ‘Sustainable Development and the Instinctive Imperative of Justice in the Global Order’
in Duncan French, ed, Global Justice and Sustainable Development (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2010) 3. [hereinafter French, “Justice in the Global Order”]
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Alan Boyle and David Freestone, ‘Introduction’ in Alan Boyle and David Freestone, eds, International
Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001) 1. [hereinafter Boyle & Freestone]
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336

Beyerlin

337

, Dupuy

“holistic concept”.

338

, and Das all also label it a “concept”, though Das qualifies it as a

This classification as a concept appears to also be supported by the

majority decision in the ICJ’s decision in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros.

339

Judge

Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion in this case, however, states that sustainable
development is “more than a mere concept, but as a principle with normative value”.

340

Judge Weeramantry also describes sustainable development as a “principle of
reconciliation”.

341

This idea of reconciliation can also be found in the description of

sustainable development by Lowe, Magraw and Hawke, and Ellis. Lowe uses the term
“metaprinciple” and “modifying norm” which “[acts] upon other legal rules and
principles” and “establish[es] the relationships between other, primary norms.”

342

Magraw and Hawke describe the “paradigm of sustainable development” as an “overarching framework for improving quality of life throughout the world”.
Ellis it is also an “over-arching concept”
and interpretation of international law.”

336

Beyerlin, supra note 331 at 443.

337

Dupuy, supra note 322 at 461.

338

Das, supra note 137.

344

345

343

Finally, for

that “informs and influences the development

While they use different terminology, the
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Case Concerning Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7.at para 141.
[hereinafter Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros]
340

Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros, ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry).

341

Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros, ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
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Lowe, supra note 332 at 31, 33.
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Daniel Barstow Magraw & Lisa D Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta
Brunnée and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007) 613 at 614. [hereinafter Magraw & Hawke]
344

Jaye Ellis, ‘Sustainable Development and Fragmentation in International Society’ in Duncan French, ed,
Global Justice and Sustainable Development (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 57 at
59. [hereinafter Ellis, “Sustainable Development and Fragmentation”]
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Jaye Ellis, ‘Sustainable Development as a Legal Principle: A Rhetorical Analysis’ in Hélène Ruiz Fabri,
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Jana Gogolin, eds, Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law,
vol 2 2008 (Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010) 641. [hereinafter Ellis, “Sustainable
Development as a Legal Principle”]
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common thread to these conceptions of sustainable development is the over-arching,
reconciling or unifying capacity of the idea.
While it is clear that the precise label for sustainable development remains
unsettled, there is also debate as to what is its legal weight. Sands et al. boldly assert that
“[t]here can be little doubt that the concept of ‘sustainable development’ has entered the
corpus of international customary law”.

346

Many other scholars, however, do not seem so

certain that such a status in international law has been achieved. Das takes the complete
opposite position, stating that sustainable development is “devoid of binding international
legal status”.

347

Meanwhile, Ellis states that “though it does not itself have the status of a

legal norm, [it] has immense actual and potential significance to legal norms and
348

institutions.”

In any case, French aptly points out that “the question of its legal status

should in no way be considered determinative of its legal influence.”

349

French’s statement is both noteworthy and accurate, since whatever label is
attached to it, or whether it has binding or non-binding legal effect, in practice it seems to
play a very similar role to general principles of international law, as discussed in the
previous chapter. It takes on an interpretive role, guiding the understanding and
application of other rules, principles and concepts of IEL and other areas of international
law. As Ellis states, it “provide[s] guidance on analysing factual situations and
identifying particularly salient features of those situations; assigning weight to different
considerations; and interpreting the often more specific and elaborate guidance provided
by rules.”

350

In doing so, it fulfills the important unifying function in a complex

international legal system.

346

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 208.

347

Das, supra note 138 at 127.
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Ellis, “Sustainable Development and Fragmentation”, supra note 344 at 64.

349

Duncan French, ‘Sustainable development’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and Panos
Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2010) 51. [hereinafter French, “Sustainable development”]
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Ellis, “Sustainable Development as a Legal Principle”, supra note 345 at 642.
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As Philippe Sands notes, “[t]he world of international law is invariably presented
as one in which various substantive subject-matter areas exist in quasi-hermetical
isolation” where they are “taught and treated as discrete areas, subject to their own norms
and institutional structures.”

351

In reality, however, “[n]orms arising in different subject-

matter areas can and do touch. They co-mingle and they compete. These apparently
distinct subject-matter areas do not exist in a state of isolation.”

352

The unifying function

is key to Ellis’ understanding of sustainable development. She states that “[i]ntegration is
at the heart of sustainable development” as it is a “concept of reconciliation and
harmonisation among environmental, economic and social fields.”

353

In bringing together environment, economy and society, sustainable development
provides an over-arching principle (or concept or body of law) which embodies the
reality of the environment in day-to-day life: it affects numerous, if not all, aspects of life
and, therefore, areas which fall under other legal regimes in addition to environmental
law. Judge Weeramantry, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, notes links between
sustainable development and “human rights, State responsibility, environmental law,
economic and industrial law, equity, territorial Sovereignty, abuse of rights, good
neighbourliness – to mention a few”.

354

Of particular interest in this thesis are the links

sustainable developments helps to clarify between human rights, armed conflict, and the
environment. Not only is there increasing debate over whether a ‘right to a healthy
environment’ exists, but there is also significant support showing how environmental
degradation can negatively impact the realization of human rights such as the rights to
life, health home life, and property.

355

The connections between these areas of law and

351

Philippe Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International
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Sands, ibid at 43.
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Dinah Shelton, ‘Human rights and the environment: substantive rights’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David
M Ong and Panos Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 265. [hereinafter Shelton (2010)]
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IEL clearly exist - sustainable development provides, perhaps, the most direct route
between them all.
This route provided by sustainable development finds clear expression in Judge
Weermantry’ Separate Opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case in which he
champions both the right to development and the right to environmental protection as
important principles in current international law.356 Yet, these rights cannot be realized in
isolation from each other, it is essential to “achiev[e] a blend of the concepts of
development and of conservation of the environment, which alone does justice to
humanity’s obligations to itself and […] to the planet which is its home”.357 This
demands seeing the bigger picture, the interconnectedness of environment and
development and all the associated rights and responsibilities, benefits and consequences.
Environmental protection is not merely about saving trees, it is also about a right to clean
water, health care, education and development. Environmental protection has no borders it applies everywhere, and it is always necessary, in peacetime and during conflict.
Unfortunately, seeing this bigger picture often seems more difficult for those of us in the
Global North and who do not deal on a daily basis with the great domino effect
environmental degradation can have on every aspect of one’s life. As Karin Mickelson
notes, “[f]or more than thirty years, the South has been attempting to convey the
desperate circumstances in which many of its peoples exist and to convince the
international community of the ways in which these circumstances are inextricably
connected with environmental degradation.”358 We need to conceive of the ‘environment’
more broadly, “[e]nvironmental problems have to be addressed, but not in isolation from
a host of other factors. They need to be understood in a broader economic, social,
cultural, and historic context.”359
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Mickelson, ibid.
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4.2.3 Conclusion
Sustainable development and IEL are closely linked. Environmental protection is
a key priority in both areas. Many of the principles and concepts that make up sustainable
development are also principles of IEL. Two such principles are the principle of
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, which will both be explored in
greater depth in this thesis. Examining these principles through the lens of sustainable
development, in addition to their place in IEL, allows us to more clearly see the strong
links between them and other areas of international law such as human rights and
international humanitarian law. With this foundation, we can now turn to examining the
first principle of focus in this thesis, the principle of intergenerational equity.

4.3 Intergenerational Equity
In an increasingly complex world where everything from technology to
communication to the environment is changing rapidly, it is unsurprising that individuals,
governments and decision-makers may sometimes feel at a loss to keep pace. It is for this
very reason that it is increasingly crucial to consciously take into account the future
implications of our decisions. In day-to-day life people benefit from the many natural
resources available to allow fuel for cooking, water for bathing, and energy for the
production of so many products relied upon everyday. People, particularly those living in
the developed world, often take for granted the accessibility of these resources and the
ability of the planet to provide all the necessary comforts depended upon. At the same
time, many people lament the depleting ozone, melting icecaps, acid rain, and dwindling
forests that decision-makers of past generations have burdened us with in the present.
Much as the decisions of the past leave their mark on us in the present, so will our
decisions leave their mark on the planet we pass on to subsequent generations. It is
precisely this context in which the principle of intergenerational equity arises to help
emphasize the importance of making decisions based not solely on short-term
consequences, needs and interests, but also in light of considerations for future
generations. The principle of intergenerational equity, also known as the Future
Generations principle, focuses on the need of each generation to preserve the planet’s
natural and cultural heritage for future generations, balancing present needs with the
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responsibility to pass on the planet to subsequent generations in as good, or better,
condition as it was received from prior generations.

360

4.3.1 Defining Intergenerational Equity
In the simplest of terms, intergenerational equity is the responsibility of current
generations to future generations for the protection and preservation of the environment.
At the core of the concept is a strong temporal element with the idea that “each
generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from previous generations and
holds it in trust for future generations.”

361

Intergenerational equity provides each

generation with both rights and responsibilities for the environment. Edith Brown Weiss
refers to this as “rights of access to and use of property, which are coupled with
obligations to conserve that property.”

362

Each generation has the right to use and benefit

from the environment they have received from previous generations. At the same time,
each generation’s rights are restricted by their responsibility to succeeding generations.
The rights of current generations must be exercised in a manner that will ensure they pass
on to subsequent generations a world whose cultural and natural environment is in as
good, or better, condition as when they themselves received it from preceding
generations.

363

Present generations are not entitled to act in ways that could “deprive

future generations of environmental, social and economic opportunities of well-being.”

364

A recognition embodied in intergenerational equity is that “our actions today pose longterm risks to the health of our planet and to our cultural resource base for which the
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Edith Brown Weiss, ed, Environmental change and international law: New challenges and dimensions,
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992). [hereinafter Weiss (1992)]
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Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices&Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)).
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present generation will be unable to compensate future generations.”

365

People are both

custodians of the planet and users of its resources, according to Brown, which means that
as custodians humans have certain “moral obligations to future generations” and these
obligations can be transformed into “legally enforceable norms.”

366

At the same time, “as

beneficiaries of the legacy of past generations, [humans] inherit certain rights to enjoy the
fruits of this legacy, as do future generations.”

367

Edith Brown Weiss, one of the most prolific writers in the area of
intergenerational equity, identifies three kinds of equity problems between generations: i)
the depletion of resources for future generations; ii) the degradation in the quality of
resources for future generations; and, iii) access to use and benefits of the resources
received from past generations.

368

If preceding generations fail in their responsibilities to

subsequent generations, it is these subsequent generations who will bear the burden of
increased costs

369

and who will suffer the loss of natural resources and cultural heritage.

This cultural heritage is composed of different cultural resources, such as “knowledge
about economic, political and social systems, including archives and historical records,
about languages, works of art, musical compositions, literary works, architectural
treasures, and monuments.”

370

Concerns on the environmental side of the concept range

from the over-consumption and depletion of resources, to the degradation of environment
through waste disposal and the destruction of environmental services provided by forests,
soils and watersheds.

371

Ultimately, the concept of intergenerational equity encompasses a strong
temporal element requiring actors to consider both short and long-term consequences of
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their actions within the context of protection of both natural and cultural environments.
As both beneficiaries, from prior generations, and trustees, on behalf of future
generations, of these environments we, the current generation, must examine our actions
in light of their immediate effects as well as how these actions will affect these resources
over time and spanning generations. The concept is beautifully summed up by Alexandre
Kiss and Dinah Shelton, who state,
. . . [E]ach generation has the right to benefit from and develop
the natural and cultural patrimony inherited from previous
generations in such a manner that it can be passed on to future
generations in no worse condition than it was received. This
requires conservation of renewable resources, of ecosystems and
of life-support processes, as well as human knowledge and art. It
requires the avoidance of actions with harmful and irreversible
372
consequences for the natural and cultural heritage.

4.3.2 The History of Evolution of Intergenerational Equity
Having established a basic understanding of the meaning and content of the
concept of intergenerational equity, this section turns to its history and evolution in
international environmental law. Quite interestingly, “there is no society that has not, in
some way, applied the principle of current generations being responsible to future
generations” in some form or another.

373

As Edith Brown Weiss notes, the concept of

intergenerational equity, with the “fundamental thesis that we have obligations to
conserve the planet for future generations and rights to have access to its benefits”, can be
found in the “diverse legal traditions of the international community.”

374

Intergenerational equity can be found in “the common law and civil law traditions, in
Islamic law, in African customary law, and in Asian nontheistic traditions.”
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A. Kiss & D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 2d ed. (United States: Transnational
Publishers, 2000) at 254-255. [hereinafter Kiss & Shelton]
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Edward W Ploman, “Foreword” in Weiss (1989), supra note 8 at xxvii.
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Weiss (1989), ibid at 18.
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broad roots are useful in efforts to promote and strengthen the concept in modern
international law.
Within international law, the first documented use of intergenerational equity was
by the United States of America in the Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration in 1893. Its first
appearance in an international convention occurred in the 1946 International Whaling
Convention, the preamble to which states that, “Recognizing the interest of the nations of
the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented
by whale stocks”.

376

The frequency with which the concept was incorporated into

international conventions increased in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, first with the
1968 African Conservation Convention
378

[Heritage Convention].

377

and the 1972 World Heritage Convention

The Heritage Convention incorporates the idea of not only

preserving the natural environmental but also cultural heritage in Article 4, which states
that parties to the convention recognize the “duty of ensuring the identification,
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the
cultural and natural heritage”.

379

The concept can also be found in Principle 1 of the

Stockholm Declaration of 1972, produced at the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment that year, stating that, “man bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future generations.”

380

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of intergenerational equity
continued to appear in international conventions, many of which dealt with specific areas
of environmental protection. References to intergenerational equity can be seen in the

376

International Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72, 62 Stat 1716,
Can TS 1946 No 54. [emphasis added]
377

African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 15 September 1968, 1001
UNTS 3 [preamble].
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Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural Property and Natural Heritage, 16
November 1972, BTS 1985 No 2, Can TS 1976 No 45. [hereinafter Heritage Convention]
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Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UNEPOR, June 16, 1972,
UN Doc A/CONE48/14/Rev.1 (1973), reprinted in 11 ILM 1416, (1972) [Stockholm Declaration 1972] at
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preambles to conventions addressing the protection of endangered species of flora and
fauna;

381

essential renewable natural resources;

marine environment;
resources.

387

384

382

the resources of the Earth;

the environment generally;
385

natural heritage;

386

383

the

and natural

The increasing reliance and use of intergenerational equity in international

law through these decades demonstrates an increased awareness about human impact on
the environment not only for current generations but also for continuing impacts on
future generations. In order to preserve these valuable resources, increased action for

381

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993
UNTS 243, 12 ILM 1085 (CITES): “Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and
varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this
and the generations to come”
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Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific, 12 June 1976, available at: ECOLEX
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19 ILM 15: “Aware that each generation of man holds the resources of the earth for future generations and
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of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention), 21 June 1985, available at: ECOLEX
http://www.ecolex.org: “Conscious of our responsibility to manage our marine and coastal environment
and natural heritage, including its biological diversity, for the sustainable use and benefit of present and
future generations”
387

1985 Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ASEAN Convention), 9 July
1985, available at: ECOLEX <http://www.ecolex. org>: “Recognizing the importance of natural resources
for present and future generations”
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their protection was needed and realized in increasing international legal efforts for
conservation, protection and preservation.
This increasing environmental awareness of the 1970s and 1980s culminated with
the 1987 Brundtland Report, issued by the United Nations and written by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The report provided insight
into the (perhaps) competing interests of environmental protection and development.
Notably the report further developed the idea of sustainable development, stating
“Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.”

388

Crucially, the report places intergenerational equity at the epicenter of

how it defines sustainable development and the key to ongoing environmental protection.
Sustainable development and intergenerational equity continued to influence
international environmental law in the 1990s. In 1992, three environmental conventions
and one declaration were issued. The 1992 Biological Diversity Convention’s preamble
stated the parties were “[d]etermined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity
for the benefit of present and future generations.”

389

Meanwhile, Article 2(5)(c) of the

1992 Transboundary Waters Convention stated that “[i]n taking measures referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the Parties shall be guided by the following principles:
[…] (c) Water resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are
met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
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Article 3(1) of the 1992 Climate Change Convention stated that “[i]n their actions to
achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall
be guided, inter alia, by the following: 1. The Parties should protect the climate system
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
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in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.”

391

Finally, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development

[Rio Declaration] enshrined intergenerational equity in Principle 3 which states that
“[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations.”

392

The use, reliance and appearance of intergenerational equity in international law
has not been restricted to preambular statements in international Conventions and
Declarations; it has also appeared in cases and advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice [ICJ]. Two such instances are the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
Nagymaros

394

393

in 1996 and the 1997 Gabcikovo-

case between Hungary and Slovakia. In the former, the ICJ noted that “the

environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and
395

the very health of human beings, including generations unborn.”

In the latter case, the

Court acknowledged and relied upon sustainable development in its judgment,

396

with

Vice-President Weeramantry noting in his Separate Opinion that “the principle of
sustainable development is … a part of modern international law by reason not only of its
inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by
the global community.”
Brundtland Report,
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As seen in the definition of sustainable development in the

and as can be seen in the characterization of sustainable
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UNFCCC, supra note 316 at Article 3(1).
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Rio Declaration, supra note 318 at Principle 3.
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development by other international legal scholars such as Philippe Sands,

399

intergenerational equity is an integral and strong component of sustainable development.
As such, support for sustainable development can arguably be interpreted as
strengthening the status and presence in international law of intergenerational equity.

4.3.3 The Current Legal Status of Intergenerational Equity
While the growth of the presence of, and reliance on, intergenerational equity in
international environmental law suggests an ongoing strengthening of its status in
international law, it is unlikely that it has achieved customary law status. As Judge
Weeramantry notes in his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s 1995 Nuclear Tests Case Order,
intergenerational equity is “an important and rapidly developing principle of
contemporary environmental law.”

400

The more recent work of Sébastien Jodoin and

Yolanda Saito suggests that the status continues along the lines noted by Judge
Weeramantry, as they write that,
[a]lthough the principle of intergenerational equity has not yet
achieved the status of customary international law, the protection
of the interests of future generations undoubtedly forms an
important value and concern of the international community,
401
informing developments in contemporary international law.
As previously noted, the majority of references in international law to intergenerational
equity can be found in the preambles to international conventions. The preamble to a
treaty or convention “stat[es] the reasons for and underlying understandings of the
drafters and adopters of the instrument”

399

402

and also tends to provide an “express or?

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 206-210.
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UNICEF, “Introduction to the Convention on the Rights of the Child” available at:
http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Definitions.pdf.
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explicit general statement of the treaty’s objects and purposes.”

403

Thus, the inclusion of

intergenerational equity in the preambles of international conventions is important
because it provides an over-arching objective or guide for the substantive obligations to
be carried out under that convention. It appears that intergenerational equity is a strongly
established principle of international environmental law and one that continues to be used
in international conventions, declarations and legal cases.

4.3.4 Intergenerational Equity and Human Rights
The principle of intergenerational equity is one explicitly invoked in
environmental protection, but it is often invoked, sometimes implicitly, in international
human rights law. It benefits rights which are directly linked to environmental and
cultural protections, but it also aids the realization of other human rights which benefit
from the consideration of long-term and short-term impacts of actions. This section will
explore the explicit link between intergenerational equity, children’s rights and the
environment, as well as how, the principle of intergenerational equity is implicitly
interlinked with the right to health.
While debates over universality and cultural relativity persist in the field of
human rights law,

404

incorporating the principle of intergenerational equity should be a

less contentious suggestion given that the principle has roots in the many different legal
and philosophical traditions of the world.
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That this concept has broad foundations in

different cultures makes it a more easily incorporated and adapted principle for the
implementation of human rights.

403

Ian McTaggart Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984) 128.
404

P Alston, R Goodman and H Steiner, eds, International Human Rights in Context, 3d, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) 517. Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights: Universal, Relative or
Relatively Universal?” in Mashood A Baderin and Manisuli Ssenyonjo, eds, International Human Rights
Law Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 31-48.
405

Weiss (1989), supra note 8.

92
The rights of children are an excellent example of an area in which
intergenerational equity can be seen and applied, not only in its traditional milieu of
natural environment and cultural heritage, but also in a broader human rights sense.
Arguably, children can be seen as both a current and future generation. They are a current
generation in that they are alive and existing currently with rights and invested interests
in the environment, their culture, and their own well-being. However, they are also a
future generation because more often than not they do not yet have a direct voice or role
in the institutions and decision-making processes designed for the use of natural
resources and the protection of human rights. These aspects remain the purview of adults
who have reached the age of majority and can directly participate, or indirectly have a say
through voting. It is for this reason that intergenerational equity can and does play an
integral role in our approach to the rights of children: We must consider not just the
present implications of failures to protect the rights of children but also the implications
of such failures in the future for both the present generation of children and future
generations to come.
The rights of children from the traditional environmental perspective are evident
in the domestic case of Oposa v Factoran

406

in the Philippines.

In March 1990, a domestic case was brought in the Philippines by an
environmental non-governmental organization [NGO], the Philippine Ecological
Network (PEN) and its president, Antonio Oposa, on behalf of a group of children and
future generations. Grounded on a constitutional right to a ‘balanced and healthful
ecology’

407

the complainants argued that the continued destruction of the Philippines’

old-growth rainforests would deprive them and future generations of their right to a

406

Judgment of June 30, 1993 (Juan Antonio Oposa, et al. v. the Honorable Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.,
Secretary of the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources et al.), Supreme Court of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 101083 (Phil.) available at:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_101083_1993.html. [hereinafter Oposa v Factoran]
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The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article II, Section 16: “The State shall protect
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harmony of nature.” available online at http://www.gov.ph/the-philippine-constitutions/the-1987constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/.
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‘balanced and healthful ecology’. The Supreme Court of the Philippines granted standing
to the children and the NGO stating,
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
408
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
This case represents an important development in the trajectory of the principle of
intergenerational equity: it was the “first time that a nation’s highest court has explicitly
granted legal standing to representatives of future generations.”

409

Furthermore, the case

is important for its recognition of the fact that “the interests of future generations are not
abstract or unascertainable, but can be identified and advocated by a legal
representative.”

410

Current and future generations children have a vested interest in both reaping the
benefits of the environment and natural resources and in protecting these resources since
they will eventually become responsible for passing on the planet in good condition to
succeeding generations. The decisions made by those currently in power, therefore, have
both immediate and lasting effects on children throughout lives, affecting their ability to
fulfill their responsibilities to future generations.
A similar analysis applies to the right to health. Pollution and environmental
degradation are increasingly discussed in the context of the right to health.

411

As Laura

Westra notes, the protection of other human rights “mean little if the child is born with
serious mental, physical or emotional challenges, often irreversible, based on pre-birth or
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other early environmental exposure.”

412

The important link between environmental

protection and the right to health, as well as other human rights, can be found in Justice
Weeramantry’s decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case before the International Court
of Justice [ICJ]. Justice Weeramantry stated that,
The protection of the environment is … a vital part of
contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non
for numerous human rights such as the right to health and
the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on
this, as damage to the environment can impair and
undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal
413
Declaration and other human rights instruments.
The right to health is enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] which recognizes “the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
This specifically includes the “healthy development of the child”,
of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”
and control of […]diseases”

417

416

415

414

“[t]he improvement

, “[t]he prevention, treatment

, and “[t]he creation of conditions which would assure to

all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness”.

418

is echoed in Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

This right to health
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Intergenerational equity can and does play an important role in the application of
the right to health, particularly in the context of children, because failure to adequately
fulfill this right for children can have negative lifelong, as well as potentially
intergenerational, impacts. The World Health Organization notes that “[m]any challenges
faced by adults[…] can be traced back to early childhood.”

420

It must be noted that there

are often close links between poverty and poor health which are simultaneously
perpetuated through lifetimes and between generations. The impacts of such chronic
poverty “include poor nutrition and chronic ill-health, low educational achievement,
psychological harm and low aspirations.”

421

The links between poverty and poor health

are strong, for example, poverty often makes it difficult to secure adequate nutrition, “an
area where damage in early childhood can have some of the most significant effects on an
individual’s well-being, and that of the next generation.”

422

In 2011 approximately 1.5 million children died from preventable diseases

423

and

approximately 6.9 million children under 5, which equates to nearly 800 per hour,
424

died.

At the most basic level, failure to adequately fulfill the right to health for

children denies the possibility of existence for members of future generations. A child
that never gets the chance to grow up will never have the chance to participate in the
protection of the environment and rights for others, will never have the chance to have
children themselves. The right to health is not merely a right that affects current
generations, but a right, the fulfillment of which, has implications throughout the life of
the present generation and potentially ongoing impacts for future generations.
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The intergenerational impacts of inadequate realization of rights to health and a
clean environment are only exacerbated in the context of armed conflict. Warfare is not
only inherently destructive of the environment, it also threatens numerous human rights.
A resolution adopted at the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran
noted that “peace is the underlying condition for the full observance of human rights and
war is their negation”.425 More recently, the NGO Amnesty International has noted that
“[w]here wars erupt, suffering and hardship invariably follow. Conflict is the breeding
ground for mass violations of human rights including unlawful killings, torture, forced
displacement and starvation.”426 However, it is not simply these most egregious
violations of human rights which occur in periods of conflict. Rather, armed conflict has
the potential to jeopardize all human rights. For example, weapons which endanger the
environment also threaten the right to health both directly and through potential
contamination of water supplies and food sources. Attacks destroy infrastructure and
buildings, such as hospitals and schools. The general insecurity produced in regions
embroiled in conflict infringes on the ability to realize “enjoy economic, social, cultural
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedom can be
fully realized.”427 The effects of war on human rights often persist long after the conflict
has officially ended.428 These lasting effects are why intergenerational equity
considerations play an important role in the protection and realization of human rights not
merely in peacetime but also in periods of conflict.

4.4 Conclusion
The principle of intergenerational equity may have arisen in recent decades in the
field of environmental law and sustainable development, but it has the potential to inform
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other areas of law such as international human rights law and humanitarian law. The
benefits and importance of considering the long-term effects and repercussions of
decisions made in the present are manifold. It is not merely useful when dealing with the
protection and preservation of our planet’s natural and cultural heritage, but it is also
beneficial for other aspects of our well-being, such as health, education, and general
development. Broadening the application of intergenerational equity into human rights
and IHL is an ideal way to improve human rights not only in the present, but for future
generations by helping to put an end to the perpetuation of disadvantage and harms.
This chapter has provided a foundation in international environmental law and
explored its links to sustainable development and, consequently, to armed conflict. It has
also examined the principle of intergenerational equity. Intergenerational equity is a
general principle of international environmental law which necessitates considering the
short and long-term consequences of actions. There is an obligation to preserve the planet
not only for the present generation, but also for future generations. This realization is not
merely helpful for the protection of the environment, but also the protection of human
rights. Similarly, this way of thinking has important potential for guiding military actions
in armed conflicts in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law which
protect the environment and humans. The next chapter will build on this understanding of
international environmental law by exploring the second principle of focus: the
precautionary principle.
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Chapter 5
5

The Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law
All scientific work is incomplete – whether it be
observational or experimental. All scientific work is
liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge.
That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the
knowledge we already have or to postpone the action
that it appears to demand at a given time.
Sir Bradford Hill

429

5.1 Introduction
This chapter returns to the realm of international environmental law, but shifts
focus from the principle of intergenerational equity to the second key principle relied
upon in this thesis: the precautionary principle. Though a more recent development in
international law and IEL than intergenerational equity, the precautionary principle has
also come to take on an important role in the field with its emphasis on environmental
protection and its relation to scientific uncertainty. The precautionary principle is also
often considered part of, or an essential feature of, sustainable development.

430

This chapter explores the emergence and development of the precautionary
principle in international law. It examines its definition and two key components: threat
of harm and scientific uncertainty. It also discusses the burden of proof that applies to the
principle and its current legal status in international law. It then considers the principle’s
links to human health by considering the links between health and environment. Finally,
the concept of precaution under the principle is compared to that in international

429
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Ramlogan]; Rio Declaration, supra note 318.
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humanitarian law. Ultimately, this chapter aims to provide the necessary understanding of
the precautionary principle to be able to see how it can be applied in the context of
military decision-making, which will be the focus of the final chapter of this thesis.

5.2 Emergence and Development of the Precautionary
Principle in International Environmental Law
The precautionary principle began to emerge in IEL instruments in the mid-1980s,
though earlier instances of the principle can be seen in national legal systems.

431

In

particular, some scholars suggest that the principle grew out of the similar concept of
Vorsorgeprinzip in West Germany of the 1970s and 80s.

432

Precautionary thinking,

though not yet the precautionary principle, can be seen in international law prior to the
1980s in instruments such as the 1972 World Heritage Convention

433

and the 1973
434

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

The 1982 UN World Charter for Nature articulated an early version of the precautionary
principle, though, once again, it did not use the term itself. Articles 11(a) and (b) of the
Charter stated, as follows:
11. Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be
controlled, and the best available technologies that minimize
significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used; in
particular:
(a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible
damage to nature shall be avoided;
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(b) Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to
nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination;
their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits
outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential
adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities
435
should not proceed […].
The concepts of ‘significant risk to nature’, ‘adverse effects’, and irreversibility would all
come to be integral parts of the precautionary principle.
Meanwhile, the term ‘precaution’ or precautionary’ began appearing in
instruments such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
436

Layer.

The preamble to this Convention contained the phrase, “Mindful also of the

precautionary measures for the protection of the ozone layer which have already been
taken at the national and international levels”.
Convention also referenced precaution.

438

437

The 1987 Montreal Protocol to this

Also in 1987, the London Ministerial

Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
made several references to “a more precautionary approach”, “the principle of
precautionary action” and “the principle of precaution”, and state that “a precautionary
approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence”.

439

With the 1990s came an ever-increasing reliance upon, or use of, the
precautionary principle in international law. An important instrument in the trajectory of
the precautionary principle was the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable
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Development in the Economic Commission for Europe Region.

440

This was the first

international instrument, albeit a non-binding one, which “treat[ed] the principle as one of
general application and linked [to] sustainable development.”

441

Paragraph seven of the

Declaration stated:
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies
must be based on the Precautionary Principle.
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and
attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental
442
degradation.
In 1992, the principle appeared in at least six international instruments, including the
1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
443

Atlantic,

the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
444

of the Baltic Sea,

the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of

440

Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the Economic Commission for Europe
Region, 1990, UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/10 at paragraph 7. [hereinafter Bergen Declaration]
441

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 219.
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Bergen Declaration, supra note 440 at paragraph 7.

443

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention), 22 October 1992, 2354 UNTS 67; 32 ILM 1069 (1993), available at:
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/ospar_convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf, at Article
2(2)(a): “2.The Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which
preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or
energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human
health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and
the effects”. [hereinafter OSPAR Convention]
444

Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1992 (Helsinki
Convention), 9 April 1992, 507 UNTS 167; 1994 OJ (L 73) 20; 13 ILM 546 (1974) at Article 3(2): “2.The
Contracting Parties shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventive measures when there is
reason to assume that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment
may create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal
relationship between inputs and their alleged effects.”
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Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
Convention on Climate Change,

446

Agenda 21,

447

445

the 1992 UN Framework

and the 1992 Rio Declaration on

448

Environment and Development.

The articulation of the precautionary principle in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration, though a non-binding instrument, has come to be a definition of great
importance. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states:
In order to protect the environment, the Precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by states according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
449
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
This definition has since been said to reflect the core, or essence, of the principle.

450

It is

also said to be the “most cited and conclusive definition of the principle in effect at the

445

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
(Helsinki Water Convention), 17 March 1992, 1936 UNTS 269; 31 ILM 1312 (1992) at Article 2(5)(a): “5.
In taking the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the Parties shall be guided by the
following principles: (a) The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential
transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the ground that
scientific research has not fully proved a causal link between those substances, on the one hand, and the
potential transboundary impact, on the other hand”.
446

UNFCCC, supra note 313 at Article 3(3): “In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention
and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following: 3.The Parties
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest
possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socioeconomic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases
and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out
cooperatively by interested Parties.”
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Sands et al., supra note 11 at 218; Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 32.
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international level.”

451

The importance of the Principle 15 definition is also emphasized

by the fact that, “[s]ince the 1992 Rio Conference, [the precautionary principle] has been
taken up in the majority of bilateral and multilateral international treaties relating to
environmental protection.”

452

The precautionary principle has continued to appear in numerous international
instruments, both binding and non-binding, since 1992. In particular, it has appeared in
treaties, agreements, and declarations focusing on water-related pollution,
air pollution,

455

and animal and biodiversity conservation.

456

453

fisheries,

454

In all, since its emergence

in the 1980s, the precautionary principle “within the space of a decade experienced a
meteoric rise” and is now included in most environmental protection treaties.

457

In total,

there are “some 60 multilateral treaties, covering a wide array of environmental issues

451

Zander, supra note 319 at 72.

452

De Sadeleer (2010), supra note 319 at 187.

453

For example, Agreement on the Protection of the Meuse (26 April 1994,Charleville Mezieres), 34
ILM (1995), 854 at Article 3(2)(a); Agreement on the Protection of the Scheldt (26 April 1994, Charleville
Mezieres), 34 ILM (1995), 859 at Article 2(a); Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and
Sustainable Use of the Danube River (Sofia Convention) (29 June 1994, Sofia), International Environment
Reporter, 35: 251 at Article 2(4); 1995 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities, 3 November 1995, UNEP (OCA)LBA/IG.2/7, available at:
http://coralreef.noaa.gov/threats/pollution/resources/unep_lbsp_prgrm.pdf, Articles 23(i), 24, 104(b)(i),
111(a), 118(b)(i) and 124(b)(i); Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (Rotterdam Convention), (22
January 1998, Rotterdam), 1404 UNTS 59; 2001 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Antifouling Systems on Ships, 5 October 2001, London, United Kingdom, [2008] ATS 15 / AFS/CONF/26 at
Article 6(3) and (5); Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian
Sea (Tehran Convention) 4 November 2003, 44 ILM 1 (2005) at Article 5; 2004 International Convention
for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 13 February 2004, London, UK,
IMO Doc BWM/CONF/36 at fourth preambular paragraph.
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See, for example, United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement), 4 August 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (1995); 2167 UNTS 88 at Article 6.
455

See, for example, 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 10 June 2002, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, available at: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2002/2002-asean-agreement-on-transboundary-hazepollution-signed-on-10-june-2002-in-kuala-lumpur-malaysia/, at Article 3(3).
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See, for example, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena
Protocol), 28 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208; 39 ILM 1027 (2000); UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3, at
42 (2000) at Article 10(6).
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De Sadeleer (2010), supra note 319 at 183.
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ranging from air pollution to waste management”

458

in existence currently, and this

number seems likely to only continue rising.

5.3 Defining the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle has rapidly emerged as an important principle of IEL,
to the point where it is now widely used in international treaties and declarations.
However, the principle is also often criticized for being “vague and undefined”.

459

There

are at least twelve different definitions of the principle in international instruments.

460

Nonetheless, these varying definitions tend to focus around certain essential elements of
the principle and its objectives: ultimately, no matter how it is phrased, the precautionary
principle seeks to protect the environment from serious damage, even where scientific
uncertainty exists as to the causal link between the action and the damage.
The precautionary principle endeavors to respond to the lesson of history: “[t]oo
often, our experience in matters relating to the environment indicates that when we are
certain we are impotent – it is too late to repair the damage.”

461

Therefore, rather than

wait until there is scientific certainty and, most likely the damage has already occurred,
the precautionary principle “assert[s] that potential long-term, adverse, unintended
consequences should be considered in advance rather than addressed after the fact.”

462

This means acting in a precautionary manner under conditions of scientific uncertainty. It
is for this reason that the principle is often associated with the adage ‘better safe than
sorry’

463

and scholars, such as Arie Trouwborst, note that the “principle is supposed to

458

De Sadeleer (2010), ibid at 187.

459

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 6.
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Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford & New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 97. [hereinafter De Sadeleer (2002)]
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Cameron (1999), supra note 9 at 29.
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Peter J Balint, Ronald E Stewart, Anand Desai and Lawrence C Walters, eds, Wicked Environmental
Problems: Managing Uncertainty and Conflict (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011) at 66. [hereinafter
Balint et al.]
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De Sadeleer (2002), supra note 460 at 92.
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ensure that erring, which after all is human, is done on the side of caution and not to the
464

detriment of the environment.”

In seeking to protect the environment from degradation at the hands of humans,
several key elements of the principle can be isolated. Timothy O’Riordan and James
Cameron, an environmental scientist and a lawyer respectively, identify six basic
concepts they find in the precautionary principle: (1) preventative anticipation; (2)
safeguarding of ecological space; (3) proportionality of response or cost-effectiveness of
margins of error; (4) duty of care or onus of proof on those who propose change; (5)
promoting the cause of intrinsic natural rights; and (6) paying for past ecological debt.

465

Though, having identified these concepts, O’Riordan and Cameron go on to state that
“[b]y no means all of these interpretations are formally approved in international law and
common practice.”

466

Rather, in practice, they suggest, the principle boils down to

“act[ing] prudently where there is sufficient scientific evidence and where action can be
justified on reasonable judgments of cost effectiveness and where inaction could lead to
potential irreversibility or demonstrate harm to the defenders and future generations.”

467

Meanwhile Romeo Quijano, a medical doctor and toxicologist, identifies five
essential elements to the precautionary principle: (1) prevention [of environmental harm];
(2) reverse onus [of proof]; (3) elimination [of harms/risks]; (4) community orientation
[right to health and healthy environment trumps economic and property rights]; and (5)
uncertainty is a threat.

464

468

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 5.

465

Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron. “The History and contemporary significance of the
precautionary principle” in Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron, eds, Interpreting the Precautionary
Principle (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1994) 12 at 17-18. [hereinafter O’Riordan & Cameron,
“History”]
466

O’Riordan & Cameron, “History”, ibid at 18.

467

O’Riordan & Cameron, “History”, ibid. [emphasis in original]

468

Romeo F Quijano, “Elements of the Precautionary Principle” in Joel A Tickner, ed, Precaution,
Environmental Science and Preventive Public Policy (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003) 21 at 23-26.
[hereinafter Quijano]
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Per Sandin, a philosopher specializing in bioethics and environmental ethics,
speaks of four dimensions to the precautionary principle: “(1) the threat dimension
concerns the possible threat, (2) the uncertainty dimension concerns the limits of
knowledge, (3) the action dimension concerns the response to the threat, and (4) the
command dimension concerns the way in which the action is prescribed.”

469

He suggests

that, “most formulations of the Precautionary Principle can be recast by inserting the
formulations expressing the four dimensions into the following if-clause: If there is (1) a
threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of action (4) is mandatory.”

470

Finally, Trouwborst, a legal scholar, limits himself to identifying three common
elements to definitions of the precautionary principle: “(1) threat of harm, (2) uncertainty,
and (3) action.” He also suggests a basic definition which encompasses these key
components common among the many varying definitions of the precautionary principle
in existence. That basic definition is expressed as follows:
Wherever, on the basis of the best information available,
there are reasonable grounds for concern that serious
and/or irreversible harm to the environment may occur,
effective and proportional action to prevent and/or abate
this harm must be taken, including in situations of
scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or
471
probability of the potential harm.
Common to these different articulations and classifications of key elements of the
precautionary principle are a threat of harm to the environment and related uncertainty.
These are very much the key components of the principle and will be discussed in greater
detail below. First, however, an important note must be made with regards to the
terminology used in labeling the principle. Some instruments will refer to it as the
“precautionary principle”, while others use the term “precautionary approach”.
According to some scholars, a ‘precautionary approach’ is softer and less legalistic than a

469

Per Sandin, “Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle” (1999) 5:5 Human and Ecological Risk
Assessment 889 at 891. [hereinafter Sandin]
470

Sandin, ibid.

471

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 159.
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‘precautionary principle’.

472

This is a view in which ‘precautionary approach’ is seen as

not legally binding, as compared to a legal principle.

473

There seems to be a geographic

preference between the labels, with the European Community being more closely
associated with the term ‘precautionary principle’, while the United States seems to have
a preference for the term ‘precautionary approach’.

474

Ultimately, it seems the difference

is no more than a “semantic squabble”, with numerous scholars and international
instruments seeming to use the terms interchangeably.

475

Trouwborst notes that, in

practice, “the only real difference seems to be the terminological distinction itself.”

476

The 1995 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment
477

from Land-Based Activities uses both terms at various points in its text,

while Principle

15 of the Rio Declaration uses ‘precautionary approach’, yet the Programme for Further
Implementation of Agenda 21, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997, in referring
to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration refers to the ‘precautionary principle’.

472

De Sadeleer (2002), supra note 460 at 98; Zander, supra note 319 at 4, 29.

473

De Sadeleer (2010), supra note 319 at 186.

478

There

474

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 218. These differing opinions on the terminology, approach vs. principle
can best be seen in the WTO Beef Hormones case. This case saw a dispute between the United States and
Canada against the European Union over the use of artificial beef hormones. The European Union used in
its argument the precautionary principle, while the United States and Canada countered stating that the
precautionary approach was an approach and not a legal principle. EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) (Canada and United States v European Community), 16 January 1998, AB1997-4, WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R. [hereinafter Beef Hormones case]
475

For example, see De Sadeleer(2010), supra note 319 at 187; Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 11.

476

Trouwborst, ibid.

477

1995 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities, 3 November 1995, UNEP (OCA)LBA/IG.2/7, available at:
http://coralreef.noaa.gov/threats/pollution/resources/unep_lbsp_prgrm.pdf: Articles 23(i), 24, and 111(a),
use the term ‘precautionary approach’ while Articles 104(b)(i),118(b)(i) and 124(b)(i) use ‘precautionary
principle’; see also Trouwborst, supra note 23 at 12.
478

Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21, 19 September 1997, UN General Assembly
A/RES/S-19/2, paragraph 14, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/spec/aress19-2.htm: “4.
Progress has been made in incorporating the principles contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development - including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, […] the
precautionary principle […]”
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seems to be no tangible differences in reality between ‘precautionary approach’ and
‘precautionary principle’.

479

5.4 Threat of Harm
The threat of harm to the environment, as seen in the different components listed
above, is without doubt one of the key elements of the precautionary principle. A threat
of harm to the environment is what triggers the need for the precautionary principle in the
first place or, as Rajendra Ramlogan notes, “the presence of a threat of serious or
irreversible harm is a condition precedent for the application of the precautionary
principle.”

480

Given the pivotal role threat of harm plays in the operation and application

of the principle, it is essential to have a better understanding of what is meant by this
term. In the context of the precautionary principle, the term ‘threat of harm’ is often
found, as well as other variations such as ‘damage’ or ‘environmental degradation’ or
‘adverse impact’.

481

These different words and phrases seem to be used interchangeably

to represent the threat which triggers the precautionary principle.
Since all interactions with the environment produce some sort of effect or
potential change on the environment, it is important to distinguish between acceptable
and unacceptable environmental change. According to Trouwborst, “[e]nvironmental
change […] qualifies as harm only when it is negative”, which, in the context of the
precautionary principle, includes “the impairment of values of nature to humans and the
impairment of the intrinsic value of nature”.

482

Furthermore, generally only

anthropogenic - that is, human-caused or -produced, threats - are considered.

483

Modern

examples include deforestation, air pollution, and hunting species to the point of
extinction.
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Rio Declaration, supra at note 318; Agenda 21, supra at note 317; Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 12.
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Ramlogan, supra note 430 at 99.
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Trouwborst, ibid at 133.

483

Sandin, supra note 469 at 891.
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Since most human activity tends to have impacts on the environment, the
precautionary principle tends to include a threshold for identifying which threats, meeting
or surpassing the threshold, merit the application of the principle and which threats do not
meet the threshold and therefore do not warrant precautionary action.

484

The

environmental harm that the precautionary principle seeks to avoid “is not minor or
trivial, but tangible, appreciable and measurable.”

485

The threshold terms frequently used

in the precautionary principle are ‘serious or irreversible damage’

486

as referred to in

Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
Two key indicators of the seriousness of harm are geographic dispersion, that is,
how large an area the harm is going to affect, and the duration or persistence of the harm
over time:

487

the inference is that the larger the area affected and the more long-term or

persistent the harm, the more serious the harm. The fact that the harm is also irreversible
will also add to its seriousness, “since irreversible damage is by definition serious.”

488

However, while irreversibility of harm bolsters a finding of seriousness, serious harm is
not always irreversible.

489

For example, the damage from oil spills at sea is largely

reversible, but oil spills nonetheless “fall within the scope of the precautionary principle
owing to their seriousness.”

490

Meanwhile, irreversibility is still an indication of the

gravity of the potential harm, as well as incorporating a specific temporal element into
the harm threshold.

491

484

See, for example, Minna Pyhälä, Anne Christine Brusendorff and Hanna Paulomäki, “The precautionary
principle” in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and Panos Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on
International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 203 at 212.
[hereinafter Pyhälä et al.]
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Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 58.
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Finally, for the threat of environmental harm to trigger the precautionary principle
there must be “some indication, some hint, some concrete information suggesting that
harm may occur.”

492

It is not sufficient that there be merely a “theoretical possibility of

environmental damage”.

493

Despite this, it is also not required that the harm be a

scientific certitude either, since scientific uncertainty is the second key trigger for
precautionary action. It is simply that there must be “at least a minimal requirement of
proof” otherwise “the remotest possibilities would be eligible as a basis for precautionary
action.”

494

From this point, the question then becomes a threshold question, not about the

threat of harm, but about the degree of scientific uncertainty which triggers the
precautionary principle.

5.5 Uncertainty and Risk
The sheer complexity of the environment, its many elements, many ecosystems,
and the interconnectedness of them all, makes scientific certainty in the environmental
realm a challenge, to say the least. Isolating causes and effects becomes difficult and this
difficulty is only increased when effects may not be fully known or realized in the shortterm. Current advances in “scientific methods of risk identification and prediction have
uncovered more subtly related causes and effects that unfold over longer latency periods,
thereby calling for ever-earlier actions to anticipate uncertain future effects and to
manage suspected present causes.”

495

To understand scientific uncertainty in the context

of the precautionary principle, it is crucial to first understand uncertainty and risk in
science.
Certainty and uncertainty have slightly different meanings in the scientific context
than they do in ordinary day-to-day life. In science, “certainty is generally considered to

492

Trouwborst, ibid at 106.

493

Trouwborst, ibid.

494

Trouwborst, ibid.

495

Wiener, supra note 432 at 598.
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lie in the realm of 95%”

496

and not 100%, since 100% certainty is deemed virtually

impossible. A scientist will find something certain if the probability of occurrence or
accuracy of the finding is 95% or higher. Therefore, uncertainty in the scientific
community exists between 0 and 95 percent.

497

In terms of risks, there are certain risks

and uncertain risks. Certain risks are those where there is scientific certainty as to the link
between cause and effect, while uncertain risks are those for which the “occurrence of
such risks remains controversial at a scientific level, but it is not unreasonable to
anticipate their occurrence on the basis of certain data, even if those data have not yet
been fully validated.”

498

Uncertainty here is “a situation in which the hazard and harm is

known, but it is impossible to assign probabilities to its realisation.”

499

Uncertain risks

are the focus of the precautionary principle, whereas certain risks, since they are known,
fall under a principle of prevention.

500

For example, the risks of cancer from smoking are

well established in science. Therefore there are certain or known risks, as well as
preventative measures to prevent people acquiring cancer from smoking, such as warning
labels on packaging. In contrast, where scientific knowledge is less firmly established,
accepted risks will be uncertain and measures to prevent such risks will be precautionary.
For example, if only a single scientific study suggests eating broccoli causes cancer this
finding of risk is uncertain and taking measures to prevent this risk, such as refraining
from eating broccoli, would constitute precautionary measures.
Uncertainty, meanwhile, has a variety of sources. Uncertainty can stem from a
complete or partial lack of data.

501

This is “[t]raditionally the most common form of

496
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uncertainty” and is labeled ‘ignorance’.

502

Uncertainties may also stem from the

“imperfection of models in making predictions” or the method of research, such as
scientific results gathered in a controlled lab versus the uncontrolled real world.
Finally, uncertainty may be the result of indeterminacy.

504

503

This source of uncertainty

“means that the systems being studied operate to processes that cannot be encapsulated in
traditional scientific terms.”

505

In other words, it “refers to the layer of complexity and

unpredictability added when biological systems function in the world of human
agency.”

506

As science and technology continue to progress, it is possible for new knowledge
and capabilities to resolve past uncertainties, thereby initiating a shift from precautionary
to preventive measures.

507

In the meantime, scientific uncertainty, when combined with a

‘serious or irreversible’ threat to the environment, will trigger the precautionary principle.
The threshold terminology generally associated with scientific uncertainty in the
precautionary principle is ‘reasonable grounds for concern’.

508

This refers to the

likelihood of the threat occurring or “how (scientifically) plausible a threat must be to
trigger precaution.”

509

If there are reasonable grounds for believing the threat may

materialize, then precautionary action is required. It is suggested that this threshold falls
“somewhere between the possibility and the probability of harm coming about.”
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Finally, there are two cautions that must be expressed when dealing with
scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle. First, decision-makers must be
aware of, and give due consideration to, “countervailing risks that are created by
precautionary actions.”

511

Since most actions present a consequence, whether negative or

positive, for the environment, options for action must not be considered so narrowly as to
ignore potentially greater risks in the course of action chosen to address the initial threat
which triggered the precautionary principle.

512

Second, it is important to recognize when

scientific certainty is falsely manufactured through statistics.

513

Despite these cautions,

however, the precautionary principle is a necessary part of IEL and environmental
protection because an ounce of precaution is better than no precaution at all.

5.6 The Burden of Proof
No understanding of the precautionary principle would be complete without an
examination of the burden of proof that attaches to the principle. In the context of the
precautionary principle, the burden of proof is often described as a ‘reverse onus’ or a
‘shifting burden of proof’.

514

Traditionally, the burden of proof lies with the opponent of

the proposed activity, who must provide sufficient evidence of guilt or harm or risk of
harm, depending on the context and standard of proof in question.

515

In criminal justice,

the accused is innocent until proven guilty and has no obligation to provide evidence
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against him/herself.

516

Even in the environmental context, “[t]raditional legal standards

[…] have tended to privilege parties accused of degrading the environment; until ‘proven
wrong’ such parties can continue the activity in question.”

517

In contrast, under the precautionary principle, the burden is shifted to the
proponent of action, thereby “placing the burdens and responsibilities for safety and
understanding on producers and not putting the burden of proof of harm on the potential
518

victims.”

In doing so, the burden shifts to “the party or entity that will benefit from the

activity” and, even more importantly, “on the party best able to generate the information
needed to make the decision.”

519

The burden lies with the entity looking to change the

status quo, wherein the status quo is the current less polluted world prior to the
introduction of the newly proposed risks.

520

Such a shift in the burden of proof would seem very appropriate, perhaps even a
matter of common sense, in situations where the precautionary principle is in operation.
First, the environment and individuals likely to be the victims should the potential harms
be realized are rarely in the position to mount an objection prior to the risky activities
having taken place. They may lack knowledge about the existence of the proposed
activity, or, if known, they may lack access to information necessary to mount an
opposition, and quite often they will lack the resources to challenge the actions in court
prior to the harms having occurred. As such, the precautionary principle “calls for
assigning appropriate burdens” which demands a shift since the “aim is fairness and
accountability” for all parties involved.

521

Furthermore, the shifting burden is arguably

necessary to align with the objectives and intentions of the precautionary principle which

516
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Wiener, supra note 432 at 606.
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Cameron (1999), supra note 9 at 47.

521

Myers, supra note 496 at 48.
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“posits a presumption in favour of protection of the environment and public health.”

522

Trouwborst equates the presumption of innocence in criminal law with a presumption of
harmfulness under the precautionary principle.

523

Therefore, where threat of harm and

scientific uncertainty have triggered the precautionary principle, the maxim should be
‘harmful until proven harmless’.

524

This shifting burden is not only the product of academic discourse, but appears in
numerous international instruments which include the precautionary principle. The 1998
Wingspread Statement, produced by academics at the Wingspread Conference on the
Precautionary Principle, stated that, under the precautionary principle, “the proponent of
an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”

525

Other

international instruments that have included a precautionary burden of proof include the
526

1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,
527

Antarctic Protocol,

the 2002 Guiding Principles on Invasive Alien Species,

the 1991

528

and the

1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
529

Atlantic.

Evidence suggest that, in practice, states often apply this shifted burden, but

522

De Sadeleer (2010), supra note 319 at 203.

523

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 200.

524

Trouwborst, ibid.

525

Science and Environmental Health Network, The Wingspread Consensus Statement on the
Precautionary Principle, (1998) available at: http://www.sehn.org/state.html. [hereinafter Wingspread
Statement]
526

1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 6 February
1988, 27 ILM 868 at Article 4(1)-(4).
527

Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 10 April 1991, 30 ILM 1455 (1991) at
Articles 3, 7, and 8: a moratorium on mineral resource activities is created and a requirement that scientific
related research must complete environmental impact assessment before any scientific research may be
carried out.
528

Guiding Principles for the prevention, introduction and mitigation of impacts of alien species that
threaten ecosystems, habitats or species (annexed to Decision VI/23 adopted by the Conference of the
Parties to the CBD, The Hague, April 2002) at Article 10(1) and (2): create a prohibition on the
introduction of alien species without prior authorization under an assessment of risks and in accordance
with the precautionary principle.
529

OSPAR Convention, supra note 443 at Annex II, Article 3(3)(c) which requires parties wishing to dump
certain wastes at sea to provide scientific evidence demonstrating these products would not cause hazards
to environment or health.
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even more frequently states have used and created definitions of the precautionary
principle which are silent with regard to the burden of proof to be applied.

530

In such

cases, it is unclear whether the traditional burden of proof is automatic and assumed. A
strong argument for the precautionary style burden’s logic and trueness to the objectives
and aims of the principle itself can be made to suggest it is inherent in the invocation of
the principle even where it is not explicitly stated.
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5.7 The Legal Status of the Precautionary Principle
Despite its meteoric rise and widespread inclusion in international and domestic
legal instruments, the legal status of the precautionary principle is still subject to debate.
The question is whether the precautionary principle is a legal principle, a general
principle of international law, a customary international law norm, or, perhaps, all three.
Those who deny that the principle has achieved any of these statuses primarily attribute it
to the fact that the principle is subject to so many varying interpretations, that there are
“no clear rules of application”, and that it is “ambiguous and undefined”.

532

In contrast,

proponents of the principle note that the more general nature of the principle is essential
because in order “to be effective it must be general in character but capable of devolving
to the particular”.

533

In practice, the principle has demonstrated this capacity through its

application to both specific areas of IEL, such as ozone depletion, as well as to more
general concepts, as in the case of environmental protection and development.

530

534

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 223.

531

Such an implied burden of proof where definitions are silent has been claimed in the 1996 FAO
“Precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions”, FAO Technical Guidelines for
Responsible Fisheries 2, available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3592e/w3592e00.htm; as well as in
the Pakistani Supreme Court case Shehla Zia v WAPDA, PLD, 1994 Supreme Court 693.
532

See Dupuy, supra note 322 at 462; Zander, supra note 319 at 29-31; Dovers, supra note 514 at 89.

533

Cameron (1999), supra note 9 at 47.

534

Cameron (1999), ibid.
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Furthermore, they note that it is “characteristic of general principles with a wide scope of
application […to have] various elements […] open to interpretation”.

535

That the precautionary principle is a general principle of international law is
broadly embraced in academic discourse.
international community”

537

536

It has “received widespread support by the

and also forms “an essential part of all municipal (domestic)

systems for protecting health, safety and the environment.”

538

Cameron notes that “[i]t

has also achieved near universal recognition as a fundamental element in the creation of
new environmental policy instruments”

539

which suggests that the principle’s acceptance

is continuing to increase. In her work, Ramlogan provides an overview of some countries
which have embraced and/or applied the precautionary principle in either national
legislation and/or national courts.
India,
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Canada,
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Kenya,

545
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These countries include Pakistan,

and Trinidad and Tobago.

546
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Australia,

It appears there is a great

Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 160.
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537

Sands et al., supra note 11 at 221.
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Magraw & Hawke, supra note 343 at 632.
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Cameron(1999), supra note 9 at 30.
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Ramlogan, supra note 430 at 86-98.
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For example, see Ms Shela Zia and others v WAPDA PLD, 1994 SC 693 (Pakistani Supreme Court):
case dealt with citizens’ concerns over the proposed construction of a grid station in a residential area. The
court indicated that in matters of uncertainty they will use the precautionary principle.
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See, for example, Telstra Corporation Limited v Horsnby Shire Council, [2006] NSWLEC 133: At issue
was the emission of radiofrequency electromagnetic energy by a telecommunications carrier. The Court
accepted and gave due consideration to the precautionary principle in its decision.
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See, for example, Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No 914 of 1991:
The court applied the precautionary principle as it is required to do under national law; however, it also
noted that even without national legislation incorporating the precautionary principle, it would do so as the
principle is part of customary international law.
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See, for example, Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 SCR 241:
This case concerned the restriction of pesticide use in the town of Hudson. The court interpreted relevant
legislation in accordance with principles of international law, specifically the precautionary principle.
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See, for example, Rodgers Muema Nzioka and 2 Others v Tiomin Kenya Ltd (Civil Case No 97 of 2001)
[2001] KEHC 3: The plaintiffs in this case were seeking an injunction against a titanium mining company
based on concerns for environmental health. The court stated that it must be guided in its judgment by
precautionary principles.
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deal of evidence to support not only widespread practice by many states, but also
recognition by many national courts that the precautionary principle has achieved
international legal status.
In addition, there is confirmation that the precautionary principle is not only a
general principle of international law, but that it has also attained customary status.

547

The widespread international and domestic support equally bolsters the conclusion that it
has reached customary law status and general principle status. Furthermore, Trouwborst
states that, “there is a core content of the precautionary principle on which there is
apparent agreement among states”.

548

This core content of the customary precautionary

principle includes the risk of “serious and/or irreversible harm to the environment” and
“scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or probability of the potential
harm”, followed by the requirement to take “effective and proportional action to abate
this harm
The decisions of international courts and tribunals have done little to clarify the
legal status of the precautionary principle. International case law has yet to fully embrace,
or alternatively denounce, the precautionary principle. It has been raised before different
courts and tribunals and, more often than not, they have refrained from addressing the
subject. New Zealand raised the precautionary principle before the ICJ in the Nuclear
Test case.

549

Though the ICJ did not address it in its judgment, Ad Hoc Judge Palmer and

Judge Weeramentry each addressed the principle in their dissenting opinions. Ad Hoc
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See, for example, People United Respecting the Environment and Rights Action Group v Environmental
Management Authority, Alutrint Limited and the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, CV 200702263: This case dealt with the disposal of spent pot liner and air pollution in a proposed smelter project.
The judge examined the precautionary principle in the matter.
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Cameron, “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law” in Timothy O’Riordan & James
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119
Judge Palmer stated that the “precautionary principles ha[d] developed rapidly and
m[ight] now be a principle of customary international law relating to the
environment”,

550

while Judge Weeramantry’s remarks acknowledged the shifted burden

that exists under the precautionary principle and said the principle “was gaining
increasing support as part of the international law of the environment”.

551

The

precautionary principle was raised again by Hungary in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case
and, once again, the ICJ chose not to address it in its judgment.

552

In the 2010 Pulp Mills

case before the ICJ, both parties - Argentina and Uruguay - discussed the precautionary
principle in their submissions, but the majority judgment did not deal with the principle,
other than to say it did not accept that it “operates as a reversal of the burden of proof”.

553

Judge Trinidade, in his separate opinion, discussed the precautionary principle at length.
On the failure of his colleagues to address the precautionary principle in their judgment,
he stated: “It escapes my comprehension why the ICJ has so far had so much precaution
with the precautionary principle.”

554

He noted that both parties to the dispute seemed to

have accepted the principle and only disagreed over whether it applied in the particular
circumstances of the case.

555

Finally, he noted that “[t]he fact that the Court’s Judgment

silenced on them does not mean that the principles of prevention and of precaution do not
exist. They do exist and apply, and are […] of the utmost importance as part of the jus
necessarium. We can hardly speak of International Environmental Law nowadays
without those general principles.”
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Elsewhere, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has showed a
willingness to both discuss and embrace the precautionary principle. In its Advisory
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Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, it noted the increasing use of the principle
in international instruments and expressed the opinion that this had “initiated a trend
towards making this approach part of customary international law.”

557

Ultimately, despite unclear articulation and application by international courts,
there appears to be strong support for concluding that the precautionary principle is both
a general principle of international law and customary law.

5.8 Health and the Precautionary Principle
The legal status debate also includes debate over whether a customary
precautionary principle is limited to environmental protection or whether it also
encompasses precaution towards risks to human health. Human health is often reliant on
a healthy environment. Environmental degradation in the form of air pollution, water
contamination, or health risks entering the food chain can have negative effects on human
health.
Many scholars include risks to health as part of the precautionary principle. It is
one part of a broader definition of ‘environment’, such as was used in the 2005 Iron
Rhine case decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court defined
‘environment’ as including “air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and
sites, human health and safety, and climate.”

558

Furthermore, it is very difficult to

separate one from the other since a healthy environment promotes good human health
and, even more so, an unhealthy environment is likely to have negative health impacts on
559

individuals.

In spite of this, Trouwborst suggests that the customary legal definition of
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Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory
Opinion, 1 February 2011, at para 135, available at:
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/Adv_Op_010211_eng.pdf .
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Trouwborst, supra note 319 at 16.
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the precautionary principle does not include “health protection in its own right” within its
scope.

560

However, human health “may be deemed as included within [the principle’s

scope] as far as its protection from adverse environmental impacts is concerned.”

561

That

is, while he suggests that health issues such as food safety may not fall under the
customary principle,

562

health risks from water contaminants or air pollution would fall

within its purview. Conversely, other scholars take the inclusion of health protection as
an inherent part of the precautionary principle.

563

It is difficult to separate many environmental threats from the consequent threats
they pose to human health. Oftentimes, the threat to human health can be an important
factor in the assessment of the severity of the threat of harm under the precautionary
principle. This link between the environment and health is often even more evident in
conflict zones where many weapons simultaneously threaten both the environment and
human health. This link and the consideration of threats to human health under the
precautionary principle will become more evident and more important in the following
chapter of this thesis. Before we can begin to bring together the principles of IEL with the
protections of IHL, there are two concepts which appear in both fields that must be
examined to understand their similarities and differences.

5.9 Precaution and Proportion: The Precautionary Principle
versus International Humanitarian Law
Proportionality arises under the precautionary principle when considering the
course of action for addressing the threat of harm that has arisen.

564

Under the

precautionary principle, proportionality seeks to ensure that responses to threats of harm
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For example, see Dayna Nadine Scott, “When Precaution Points Two Ways: Confronting "West Nile
Fever" (2005) 20:2 Can J L & Soc’y 27; Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner, Protecting Public Health
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“correspond to the perceived dimensions of the risk involved.”

565

In other words, “[t]he

more significant or the more serious the expected environmental impact, the more
rigorous preventive or abatement measures may, respectively must be.”

566

Should there

be more than one option available and uncertainty or doubt as to which should be chosen,
in keeping with the precautionary principle the option which errs on the side of protecting
the environment should be selected.

567

The concepts of precaution and proportionality are also, as discussed earlier, part
of IHL. Under IHL proportionality is the “requirement to select the method or means of
attack likely to cause the least collateral damage or incidental injury, all other things
being equal, relative to the military advantage obtained.”

568

Even though the

terminology, of precaution and proportionality, is similar or the same in both IEL and
IHL, the definitions and applications vary. Proportionality under the precautionary
principle is similar to proportionality under IHL in that it serves to “[adjust] the means to
the objective” and demands that “a course of action is chosen that corresponds to the size
of the risk involved.”

569

Where it differs is in the objective that is sought. Under the

precautionary principle, actors are seeking to balance the desired action, development,
with environmental protection. In this balancing and weighing process “the precautionary
principle posits a presumption in favour of protection of the environment and public
health.”

570

In IHL, the consideration of proportionality results in weighing and balancing

military necessity with humanity. Generally, the benefit of the doubt is given to the
military actors.
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Trouwborst, ibid at 150.
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Trouwborst, ibid at 158.
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Schmitt, supra note 75 at 150.
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Richard A Falk, Revitalizing International Law (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989) at 168. This
can also be inferred from the remark in Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International
Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 263 which states “Military
necessity trumps the modest health risks to civilians [in the context of depleted uranium weapons].” It can
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Precaution also differs in its precise meaning between the precautionary principle
and IHL. While precaution under IHL without question “constitute[s] obligatory
standards of conduct”

572

and is enshrined in customary international law,

573

as we have

seen, the precautionary principle, though likely the same, it is not quite so firmly as
established as in IHL. Yet it would appear that precaution under IHL “remains relatively
abstract”,

574

perhaps even more so than under the precautionary principle. Whereas the

precautionary principle includes thresholds such as ‘serious or irreversible harm’ and
‘reasonable grounds for concern’, precaution in IHL is merely phrased as ‘all feasible
precautions’ and left at that. This is worrisome because it largely leaves it to the military
decision-maker to determine what the requirements for fulfilling this duty will be. It fails
to provide a yardstick by which to gauge whether the duty has been fulfilled.
Whereas scientific uncertainty triggers the precautionary principle, the duty to
take precautions in IHL flows from the principle of distinction. Outside the language of
the duty, there is more discussion such that the duty of precaution in IHL can be said to
include things such as a “duty to verify the nature of the target”,

575

an “obligation to

choose the military objective that involves the least danger to civilian lives and civilian
objects”

576

and an “obligation to give advance warning of an attack that may affect the

civilian population”.

577

Even so, even the latter obligation on giving warnings is not

also be inferred from the decision of the ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, not to open a criminal
investigation into NATO bombings in Kosovo, see “Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing
Campaign”, 13 June 2000, The Hague, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7846.
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absolute. Since “surprise has become a primordial condition for success”,

578

if

precautions are taken, it can be asked whether ‘all feasible precautions’ are actually
taken. So, while precaution seems to demand certain outcomes (warnings, timing of
attacks, weapon selection), some question “whether, and to what extent, [precaution in
IHL] can be interpreted as legitimizing mistakes.”

579

The nature of the obligations said to

flow from precaution in IHL would seem to suggest it has more of a preventive than
precautionary nature, as precautionary is understood in the IEL context, since the IHL
precaution provisions appear to target common-sense risks to civilians which do not
attract a high degree of uncertainty. Examples might include, for instance, providing a
warning in advance to clear an area of civilians or attacking at night when fewer civilians
are out or in the area. If civilians are unaware of a pending attack they cannot take
measures to protect themselves. Likewise, if an attack is conducted during the day there
are likely to be more civilians in the streets, in office buildings, etc.. Issuing a warning
and/or attacking at night would simply seem to be common sense preventive measures,
rather than precautionary in the sense of the precautionary principle.
Meanwhile, the precautionary principle has thresholds which trigger action and is
closely linked to science even if uncertainty plays a large role. Fundamentally, where
precaution in IHL seems to demand certain actions/outcomes, “[a] fundamental feature of
the precautionary principle is that it is not concerned with guaranteeing particular
outcome, but rather with the process by which a decision is made.”

580

Finally, the

precautionary principle prioritizes the protection of the environment above all else, with
human health perhaps only an indirect beneficiary of this stringent protection. In contrast,
precaution in IHL focuses primarily on avoiding harm to civilian lives and civilian
objects.
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Stepan Wood, eds, Environmental Law for Sustainability (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 97 at 118.
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While precaution and proportionality in IHL and under the precautionary
principle both seek to protect entities from damage, under the precautionary principle
they appear to provide better protection. Both seek to balance the size of the threat with
the response to the harm, but under IHL the benefit of the doubt is often given to the
military actor carrying out the risky activity. Meanwhile, under the precautionary
principle the benefit of the doubt lies in favor of protecting the environment.
Furthermore, the precautionary principle provides more substantive content and
guidelines for assessing precaution (threat of serious or irreversible harm and scientific
uncertainty) while under IHL a general and vague duty to take ‘all feasible precautions’ is
given with little guidance as to the content of that duty. The precautionary principle
provides more detailed and more protective standards than precaution and proportionality
under IHL.

5.10

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the precautionary principle within international
environmental law. Following the rapid development of the principle it has examined its
definition and key components of threat of harm, scientific uncertainty and shifted burden
of proof. It has also examined its legal status which suggests that it is both a general
principle of international law and, quite possibly, a principle of customary international
environmental law as well. The important link between the protection of health and the
environment under the precautionary principle was also examined. Finally, the concepts
of precaution and proportionality in international humanitarian law and under the
precautionary principle were discussed and compared.
While some debate may exist as to the definition and legal status of the
precautionary principle, it is apparent that key elements may be drawn from it, namely,
the threat of harm and scientific uncertainty. These two elements act as triggers for the
principle, calling it into action to ensure decision-making processes are used which
prioritize environmental protection in the face of these threats and uncertainties. It is also
clear that the precautionary principle has become a common inclusion in environmental
legal and policy instruments, both general and specific. Not only has the principle taken
on a key role internationally, it has been embraced domestically by states around the
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world. It would appear that the precautionary principle is most certainly a general
principle of international law, and likely also a part of customary international law.
This thesis has explored both intergenerational equity and the precautionary
principle, in addition to general principles of international law and the protection of
civilians and the environment in IHL. All of these elements fit together. Both
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle have been shown to be general
principles of international law. The detailed examination of the functions of general
principles in Chapter three, therefore, provides guidance on how intergenerational equity
and the precautionary principle can be used to unify, fill gaps, interpret and develop
international law, including international humanitarian law. The next chapter will
therefore explore how intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle could be
applied in military decision-making so as to limit instances in which civilian and
environmental casualties can be justified within the context of international humanitarian
law.
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Chapter 6
6

Application of IEL Principles to Military Decision-Making

6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have explored the main components of this thesis: (1) the
current status of IHL protections for civilians and the environment; (2) the status and role
of general principles of international law; (3) IEL, sustainable development, and the
principle of intergenerational equity; and (4) the precautionary principle in IEL. This
chapter will establish how these components can work together in military decisionmaking to provide more clarity and ensure that existing legal protections for civilians and
the environment are better respected in practice.
To demonstrate this, the chapter will begin with a look at the question of how IEL
- whether treaty provisions, principles or customary laws – can apply during armed
conflict. It will then turn to the examples discussed in chapter two: the use of cluster
munitions by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and the use of depleted uranium weapons by
Coalition forces in Iraq in 2003. While reference will be made to how these examples
fare under the specific environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I, the focus will
be on how considerations of intergenerational equity and precaution can improve
protection in conducting proportionality assessments for military action under the
traditional principles and provisions relating to the protection of civilians and objects.

6.2 The Application of International Environmental Law in
Armed Conflicts
It is a truth universally acknowledged that armed conflict causes the destruction
and degradation of the environment, not merely during conflict but continuing even once
a conflict has ended.581 This damage is not only direct, such as the defoliation of forests
in Vietnam, but also indirect, such as when unexploded ordnance make arable lands

581

See e.g. Bothe et al., supra note 117 at 570; Schmitt (1997), supra note 117 at 96; Hourcle, supra note
117 at 659.
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unusable, thereby endangering not only the environment, but also “people’s health,
livelihoods, and security.”582 As concern for the protection of the environment in general
has increased, scholars such as Richard Tarasofsky have questioned “whether a new
customary principle has now emerged which directly protects the environment.”583 In
fact, the International Law Commission’s [ILC] Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind indicates that such a customary rule has emerged to protect the
environment from ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ damage.584 However, the actual
practice of States does not clearly support such a finding.585 Even so, the protection of the
environment has clearly taken on a great importance in international law and international
law has recognized and begun to attempt to address the links between the environment
and armed conflict.586
The question then becomes what, if any, effect the rules and principles of IEL
have on the rules, principles and application of IHL. The traditional view was that
treaties, and law outside IHL, did not survive the outbreak of war.587 Instead, IHL was
seen as lex specialis, taking priority over all other laws between belligerents.588 The more
modern view now sees conflict as “a continuation of interstate relation[s] and, thus,
subject to legal limits”.589 In other words, IHL is not seen as displacing other forms of
international law. Rather, it complements them and brings greater specificity to their
applicability in conflict. In the context of the interplay of IHL and IEL, “when an attack
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is launched, environmental considerations must play a role in the targeting process.”590
This is supported by several international groups of experts. The Conference of Experts
on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare held in Ottawa in 1991
expressed the opinion that rules of general or ‘peacetime’ international law protecting the
environment would normally remain applicable in armed conflict.591 A conference
convened in Munich later that same year by the International Union for Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources and the International Council of Environmental Law
affirmed the views of the experts at the Ottawa Conference and asserted that “creating
distinctions between damage to the environment during peacetime and wartime is
artificial.”592 Finally, in 2001, the ILC released its report on the Effects of Armed
Conflicts on Treaties, in which it stated that the outbreak of conflict does not necessarily
terminate or suspend the operation of treaties.593 Rather, whether a treaty remains
operative or is suspended or terminated depends on several considerations: “express
provisions and subject matter of the treaty, treaty interpretation according to Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties […], the nature and extent of the
armed conflict, and the effect of the armed conflict on the [subject matter or object of the]
treaty.”594
These comments on the continuing effect of IEL treaties in armed conflict apply
equally to customary rules of IEL.595 Furthermore, even soft law instruments which may
not have yet achieved customary law status “may still inform the interpretation and
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application of international law”596 during armed conflicts. For example, Principle 24 of
the Rio Declaration states:
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
cooperate in its further development, as necessary.597
This could be interpreted in two different ways: (1) as a statement that IEL continues to
apply in armed conflict or, alternatively, (2) an emphasis on the need for states to adhere
to existing IHL protections for the environment.598 Either way, this Principle speaks to a
clear intention that caution must be taken in armed conflict to protect the environment.599
The Martens Clause is also often cited in support of the continued operation of
IEL rules, principles and custom during armed conflict. As explained in chapter two, the
Martens Clause embraces the ‘laws of humanity’ and ‘requirements of public conscience’
as IHL continues to develop.600 Both are clearly capable, and indeed should, encompass
the protection of the environment in modern conflict scenarios.601
The ILC Study Group’s “Fragmentation of International Law”602 report also
provides solid guidance as to the operation, or co-operation, between different bodies of
international law. The study notes that characterizations such as ‘trade law’ or
‘environmental law’ “have no normative value per se” because they are merely “informal
labels that describe the instruments from the perspective of different interests”.603 They
discuss at length the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generalis, which means that the
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more specific law overrides the more general law. It is the doctrine traditionally used to
resolve conflicts between norms. It also applies in a scenario “where the specific rule
should be read and understood within the confines or against the background of the
general standard, typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical specification of the
latter.”604 In terms of the prior scenario, where it operates to make the more specific law
apply in lieu of the more general, the ILC points to its earlier publication of the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, wherein the ILC
stated that “[f]or the lex specialis to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter is
dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or
else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other.”605
The ILC Study Group also looked to the ICJ Advisory Opinion in Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996 [Nuclear Weapons], which
dealt expressly with the operation of IHL and other bodies of law during armed conflict.
In considering the legality of nuclear weapons, the ICJ considered both human rights law
and IEL. The court stated that human rights law continued to apply during armed
conflicts.606 It was only in determining the meaning of ‘arbitrariness’ in the context of
‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,607 that IHL provided more specific guidance.608 Both bodies of law
applied, and in applying them, the “more general rule remains in the background
providing interpretive direction to the special one.”609
Similarly, in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ did not dismiss IEL
in favour of IHL. Instead, the court stated that “existing international law relating to the
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protection of the environment […] indicates important environmental factors that are to
be properly taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and
rules of law applicable in armed conflict.”610 While it does not trump a state’s right to
self-defence, “[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing
whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and
proportionality.”611 The court’s opinion critically demonstrates that none of these bodies
of law “enjoys intrinsic priority over the others”, rather “a justifiable decision would have
to take all of these into account by articulating some systemic relationship between [the
different bodies of law]”.612 As the ILC aptly notes in its Fragmentation Study, “no rule,
treaty or custom, however special its subject-matter or limited the number of States
concerned by it, applies in a vacuum.”613 Armed conflict represents an intersection
between many areas of international law and, in particular, rules and customs of human
rights law and the laws protecting the environment must play an important role in the
application of IHL.

6.3 Assessing Real-Life Scenarios in Light of a Systemic
Relationship between IEL and IHL
As discussed in chapter two, the environment enjoys protection in IHL both
directly, from articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, as well as indirectly, under
the many provisions for the protection of civilian objects in Additional Protocol I.
Civilians also enjoy numerous protections from attack during armed conflict under
Additional Protocol I. Many, if not all, of these protections for civilians, civilian objects
and the environment are also found in customary international law. Despite these ample
protections, there remain instances in conflicts where it is questionable whether the letter
of the law is truly being adhered to. Such instances include, as described in chapter two,
the NATO bombings in Kosovo and the use of depleted uranium weapons by Coalition
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Forces in the 2003 Iraq War. This section will re-examine these examples under the
specific environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I and, more importantly, under
a proportionality assessment incorporating the IEL principles of intergenerational equity
and precaution.

6.3.1 NATO bombings in Kosovo
Under Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, the threshold is set by the
phrase ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’. Such damage to the environment is
prevented under IHL. Scholars note that this is, in fact, a rather high threshold to meet
since the terms are cumulative, that is, all three (widespread, long-term and severe) must
be met.614 In fact, Hulme goes so far as to state that “the [widespread, long-term and
severe] threshold of harm is so high in practice that it would seem to make little
difference.”615 Indeed, it appears that “negotiators assumed that, in practice, these
provision would ‘not impose any significant limitation on combatants waging
conventional warfare’.”616
In considering whether the use of cluster munitions by NATO in Kosovo meets
the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold, considerations of principles of IEL do
not have much relevance since it is not a balancing and weighing exercise, as seen with
proportionality assessments, but rather a question of whether the threshold is met or
not.617 Working backwards through the threshold,618 the definition for ‘severe’ entails
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destruction or disturbance of the environment ‘in some large degree’, probably beyond
the battlefield damage regularly caused in war”.619 This rather vague characterization of
the term ‘severe’ leaves plenty of room to argue that many actions or weapon systems
would fall in to this category. Some additional guidance on interpretation can perhaps be
gleaned from the understanding of the term in the ENMOD Convention, in which
‘severe’ is understood to involve “serious or significant disruption or harm to human life,
natural and economic resources or other assets.”620 While still broadly defined, this
definition provides a bit more detail on which to base a determination. Given that land
polluted by unexploded cluster munitions is rendered unusable until the ordnance has
properly and safely been removed, in addition to the severe health risk posed by
unexploded ordnance, cluster munitions clearly pose a severe risk of damage to the
environment.
Next is the question of whether the damage caused by the use cluster munitions is
long-term or long-lasting. While the term is interpreted under ENMOD to mean “lasting
for a period of months, or approximately a season”,621 indications are that, in Additional
Protocol I, the drafters intended a stricter threshold for the term with a “scale of decades,
twenty or thirty years as being a minimum”.622 Cluster munitions could meet either
threshold. Unexploded ordnance creates damage that lasts until it is safely removed and
disposed of or, in the worst-case scenario, until someone unknowingly triggers it and is
wounded or killed by the resulting explosion. Unexploded cluster munitions, therefore,
have the potential to cause damage that poses a permanent threat.
There is no definition for the final threshold term, widespread. The definition of
the same term in ENMOD suggests “encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometres”.623 This could be the term upon which cluster munitions fail
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the threshold test for Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I. It depends on
whether the damage is considered on the basis of a single attack with a small number of
bombs or if damage is considered on the broader scale of an entire military campaign.
Under the former, cluster munitions are unlikely to meet the threshold of widespread
since the dispersal of bomblets generally covers an area of only 350 to 500 metres, with
shrapnel travelling potentially a further 150 metres.624 Even when considered in the
context of an entire military campaign, there is still potential that cluster munitions would
fail to meet this part of the threshold.
Turning to a more traditional proportionality assessment, it is useful to examine
the use of cluster munitions by NATO in the specific case of the intended attack on the
airport in Niš, Serbia. In this instance, evidently technical errors led to the bombs being
dropped on the market and hospital in lieu of the airport. This fact will play a role in the
assessment of scientific uncertainty under the precautionary principle.
A first concern with cluster munitions are their indiscriminacy. This raises a red
flag, since weapons of an indiscriminate nature are prohibited under the principle of
distinction in IHL as well as in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I. Articles 51(4)(b)
and (c) state that indiscriminate attacks are “those which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or […] those which
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required
by this Protocol”.625 Once released, the bomblets cannot distinguish between combatants
and non-combatants, or between civilian objects and military objects, nor can the
shrapnel released when the individual bomblets explode. Furthermore, the unexploded
bomblets are also incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military. Instead, they
remain waiting for whomever or whatever - man, woman, child, farm stock, or wildlife will be the unfortunate one to trigger it. That the effects are also indiscriminate towards
the environment must be noted, but is, arguably, slightly less relevant. In terms of
indiscriminacy, there is no weapon system that can discriminate between military
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combatants or objects and the environment since the environment is present wherever a
military object or combatants is located. As such, military necessity in terms of an
assessment of discriminacy lessens the force of environmental protections. This is
because any form of attack will be indiscriminate towards the environment, therefore,
military necessity of being able to conduct operations necessitates indiscriminate action
vis à vis the environment.
The next assessment is to examine the balancing of military necessity and
humanity in the attack on the airport of Niš. This assessment demonstrates the true
benefit and utility of incorporating principles of IEL into the decision-making process.
The precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity help provide
greater definition to humanity protections for civilians and civilian objects, including the
environment, in IHL. While the use of cluster munitions near population-dense areas was
questioned at the time,626 these principles provide a more a more clear and defined
criteria by which to evaluate the choices of military actors. The attack occurred in close
proximity to urban areas, and the airport - a dual use object with both civilian and
military purposes – was targeted with a weapon that could not discriminate between the
two. These two facts cause concern since the military necessity applies only to the attack
on the military objective, the airport, while weighing against it is the indiscriminate
nature of the weapon and the threat it poses to a civilian object, the airport, civilians lives
in proximity to that object, and the environment. The threat has the potential to be both
severe and long-lasting.
Furthermore, serious questions of scientific uncertainty are raised by the use of
cluster munitions both in terms of their threats of harm to the environment as well as to
human health. The scientific uncertainty arises with the failure rate of the bomblets
because of the numbers which fail to explode on initial impact and remain unexploded
ordnance. The general failure rate provided by officials is about 5%, though this varies,
and in Kosovo failure rates see estimate from 8-12% or even as high as 20%.627 Of
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course, this is merely an average failure rate and “[t]o achieve that average rate of failure
some dispensers will have failed totally, some will have had 50 per cent malfunctions,
others 20 per cent and many will have had only one or two or no failed submunitions.”628
What’s more, as McGrath notes, “it is the actual number of unexploded bomblets in a
given situation that is of significance.”629 Some of the most conservative estimates state
that approximately a minimum of 234,123 submunitions fell during the Kosovo
Conflict.630 At a failure rate of 5%, that would still mean approximately 11,706
unexploded bomblets lay over the former Yugoslavia by the conflict’s end. After the
conflict, clearance survey reports indicated that approximately 54% of the contaminated
lands were agricultural.631 Still, whether the agricultural lands of a community are
covered by 500 or 50 unexploded bomblets will make little difference to the people who
can no longer safely use those lands for their own food needs or as a source of income
because they have no way of knowing how many unexploded bomblets cover their land
or where exactly they lie.632 Therefore, there is uncertainty with cluster munitions with
regards to where they will land, where their submunitions will land, whether their
submunitions will detonate on impact, or how many will be left behind as unexploded
ordnance.
The unexploded ordnance left behind pose a particular long-term threat to both
the environment and human health. As noted, they make the land on which they lay
unusable, essentially polluting it to the point where it can no longer safely be used. They
pose an ongoing health risk to the civilian population since they could still explode if
triggered by being picked up, kicked, or jostled. This risk can span generations,
depending on the resources available for safe disposal units and the time it takes to safely
clear a contaminated area.
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This demonstrates that cluster munitions, particular in populated areas, but even
in agricultural rural areas, pose a significant threat to both civilians and civilian objects,
including the environment. There is also significant scientific uncertainty surrounding
where they will land and whether they will detonate or become unexploded ordnance.
They also threaten to pose risks for long periods, possibly generations. These fulfill the
guiding markers provided by the precautionary principle and doctrine of intergenerational
equity, but the other side of the scale - military necessity - must also be considered.
As is often the case, states which use cluster munitions, including the U.S. and
U.K. as prominent players in NATO’s Kosovo operations, emphasize the military utility
of the weapon. They claim that cluster munitions possess “exceptional effectiveness
against specific types of targets”.633 In fact, Moyes suggests, the data indicates that the
utility seems to be more “in the wide range of targets against which they could plausibly
be deployed.” In particular, they “were considered useful where vegetation cover
obscured targets” which “suggests that cluster munitions were more a weapon of
convenience than a specific tool for a specific job.”634 Furthermore, there was evidence
from the use of cluster munitions during the 1991 Gulf War that soft ground was a major
factor leading to failures to detonate, which makes the decision to “use […] cluster
bombs against concealed targets in forested areas, despite evidence that a common
weakness of the weapon is an inability to penetrate overgrowth without a high percentage
of malfunctions”635 particularly confusing and raises questions about the thoroughness
and, perhaps even good faith, put into the proportionality assessments for those
operations. Finally the US Munitions Effects Assessment Team, who conducted an
assessment in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, “found that of 744
‘confirmed’ NATO strikes, evidence could only be found of 58 successful strikes.”636
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Another argument military officials raise in support of their continuing use of
cluster munitions is that all weapons have failure rates.637 Moyes provides three solid
counterarguments to this assertion. First, he notes that the high number of bomblets “
radically alters the probability of unexploded items being produced.”638 An ordinary
bomb will mean one unexploded item, while a single bomb containing 147 submunitions
at a failure rate of 5%, means 7 unexploded ordnance. Second, with cluster munitions, the
risk of civilian injury is increased because one large unexploded bomb is more noticeable
and more easily avoided than many small unexploded and seemingly benign bomblets.639
Finally, “[t]he failure rates of cluster munitions are likely to be higher than those of
unitary munitions because the process of delivery involves more stages and at each of
these stages failures can occur that result in unexploded ordnance.”640
Overall, it would seem that claims of the essential nature or military utility of
cluster munitions are greatly over-exaggerated. Meanwhile, the threat to civilians and the
environment is a real and substantial one. By applying the guidelines provided by the
doctrine of intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, it is clear that,
whatever proportionality assessment was made in regard to this attack, it was inadequate.

6.3.2 Depleted Uranium Weapons in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003
Iraq War
Applying the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold in Articles 35(3) and
55 of Additional Protocol I to depleted uranium weapons is more difficult than with
cluster munitions because there is even greater uncertainty about the effects of the
weapon on the environment. In terms of widespread damage, on impact a depleted
uranium weapon produces an aerosolized toxic dust which can travel up to 400m from
the impact site.641 Contamination from initial deployment, as well as produced by the
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decay of the metal over time where it lands, could potentially spread up to 6km642 and
risks leaching into not only the soil but the water table as well. Ultimately, as Wexler
notes, “the widespread effects debate turns on the amount of [depleted uranium weapons]
used in a given conflict and the ability of [depleted uranium] dust to travel through the
air, water, and soil.”643 Based on this evidence, it seems questionable that depleted
uranium weapons would be able to meet the widespread part of the threshold.
The long-term aspect of the threshold is more easily met for depleted uranium
weapons. Depleted uranium weapons can “take several hundred years to fully corrode
into the environment” and as such present a risk or threat of long-term damage to the
environment.644
Finally, the assessment of whether the damage will be ‘severe’ is also a somewhat
problematic one in this context. The worst-case scenarios presented by some scientists of
polluted soils, water, flora and fauna, as well as the risks of cancer and other health
problems to humans would certainly qualify as severe,645 but it is difficult to know how
to weigh these when the scientific uncertainty is quite high. In such a case, the
precautionary principle is useful: depleted uranium weapons do indeed represent a threat
of severe damage because the degree of potential risk to health and the environment is so
high and long-lasting that when erring on the side of caution we should assume the threat
to be sufficiently severe so as to require precautionary measures. Ultimately, however,
since the ‘widespread’ aspect of the threshold is still unmet, depleted uranium weapons
would still fail the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold overall.
Turning to the proportionality assessment, once again it appears that it can
provide greater protection for civilians and the environment than the specific

642

Hulme, “Environmental protection”, supra note 117 at 598.

643

Wexler, supra note 117 at 484.

644

Wexler, ibid.

645

See e.g. Wexler, ibid at 475-476; Hulme, “Environmental protection”, supra note 117 at 598; Fairlie,
supra note 112; WHO, “Depleted uranium”, supra note 111; International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, “Depleted Uranium Weapons and Acute Post-War Health Effects: An IPPNW Assessment”
(2001) available at: http://ippnw.org/pdf/depleted-uranium-ippnw-assessment.pdf [hereinafter IPPNW]

141
environmental provisions of IHL. Apart from the threats to the environment mentioned
above posed by depleted uranium weapons there are significant potential threats to
human health. If used near civilian populations, the risk of inhalation of the toxic dust
from depleted uranium weapons may be high.646 There is also risk to anyone who may
attempt to salvage from contaminated vehicles or to children who may play in the vicinity
of these discarded materials.647 People risk exposure through the ingestions of foods
grown in contaminated soil and by drinking water contaminated by corroding depleted
uranium weapons leaching into the groundwater.648 The health concerns include cancer,
birth defects and potential neurological disorders and other symptoms associated with the
so-called ‘Gulf War Syndrome’. This latter syndrome plagues many veterans who have
been exposed to depleted uranium weapons in conflicts.649
These all amount to a serious threat to both the environment and human health.
There is also, as previously noted, significant scientific uncertainty regarding the effects
of depleted uranium weapons. Furthermore, there is “much disagreement among
scientists as to the exact effects of depleted uranium”.650 Proponents of depleted uranium
weapons, such as Solis, rely on a report by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) in 2000, which reported insignificant levels of depleted uranium at sites
examined, as evidence that depleted uranium weapons are legal and in compliance with
all IHL requirements.651 What Solis, and others, fail to note is that, in that same report,
UNEP repeatedly mentions the scientific uncertainties regarding depleted uranium
weapons and urges precaution and precautionary measures – essentially, they invoke the
precautionary principle.652 The World Health Organization also indicates that
contamination levels may rise over periods of years and, as such, sites must be monitored
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over time and caution taken.653 The uncertainty is perhaps greater with regards to
depleted uranium weapons than with cluster munitions, but the threat is nonetheless very
serious with the potential to be quite long-lasting. As such, according to the guiding
markers set out within intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, this
would suggest that depleted uranium weapons should not be used.
Still, we must consider this finding in light of the military necessity arguments on
the other side. One of the military benefits of depleted uranium is that it is “inexpensive
and plentiful supplies are available.”654 Wexler notes four further strategic benefits of
depleted uranium weapons: they “extend a tank’s effective firing range,” they “allow
better tank penetration than traditional tungsten rounds do,” they “set hard targets on
fire,” and “[depleted uranium] armored tanks are more difficult to penetrate than
unarmored tanks.”655 Indeed, one of the most often cited benefits is that the high density
of depleted uranium makes it good at penetrating armored vehicles656 and, one would
assume, at preventing armored vehicles from being penetrated. There are, however,
alternative weapons capable of providing the same results without the radioactivity of
depleted uranium, such as tungsten, as Wexler notes, however, it is not as effective as
depleted uranium.657 This would seem to also be scientifically uncertain, as the U.K.based International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons notes a British government study
which found “a tungsten round combined with a German smoothbore barrel more
effective than the current CHARM3 [depleted uranium] round”.658 A potentially,
somewhat less effective weapon may be required to strike the necessary balance between
military necessity and humanity. Still, the risks of the potential alternatives must also be
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considered. Therefore, it must also be noted that tungsten itself, as a heavy metal, may,
over time, present similar risks as depleted uranium weapons when it comes to water and
food resources.659 Either way, these weapons mandate further research to better evaluate
the risks they pose to people and the environment. As for the outcome of the
proportionality assessment, since both weapons pose uncertain risks, ideally they should
both be banned until their risks are better understood. However given that military
necessity is also a weighty consideration, the tungsten rounds, which seem to pose ever
so slightly less health risks, would be preferable to depleted uranium.

6.4 Conclusion
Ultimately, it would seem that the traditional proportionality assessment applied
in light of the relevant guiding principles of intergenerational equity and precaution
provides a clearer guideline for evaluating military decision-making in armed conflict.
The rigid and extremely high ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold in the specific
environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I makes them less sensitive to realities
of environmental harms. There will always be a balancing of conflicting interests in
armed conflict. Military necessity and humanity will forever be locked in a tug-of-war,
but the intended protections are likely to be better respected if more clarity is provided in
the considerations which must be evaluated in military decision-making. Providing
guidelines such as protecting the planet from intergenerational harms and taking
precautions to avoid irreversible damage even in the face of scientific uncertainty will
allow individuals, civilians, NGOs, and other States to better understand, evaluate, and, if
necessary, challenge the decision-making of armed forces in conflict.
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Chapter 7
7

Conclusion
This final chapter restates the research problem and summarizes the findings and

approach proposed in the thesis. It also discusses some limitations of the work and
suggests areas for further research.
This thesis set out to propose a way of improving the application of existing
protections in IHL for civilians and the environment so that the intent and purpose of the
formal protections will be better realized in practice. It identified a gap between theory
and practice, that is, between the extensive formal protections for civilians and the
environment in armed conflict and the realities in practice of harm and damage suffered
by civilians and the environment during conflicts, often with ongoing and lasting effects
after the conflict has ended.
These formal protections in IHL were examined in chapter one, where it was
shown that the protection of civilians during armed conflict has a long history stretching
back to the 19th century. This history of IHL also includes the long-established
restrictions on the methods and means of warfare available to combatants. It is firmly
entrenched that the right to wage war is not unlimited, but rather carefully restricted. As
environmental awareness grew in the 20th century, IHL began to incorporate specific
protections for the environment during conflict, though it is important to note that the
environment also enjoys protection indirectly as a civilian object and therefore is also
protected by requirements of proportionality. IHL is governed chiefly by efforts to
balance military necessity and humanity, but the 1999 bombings in Kosovo by NATO
and the use of depleted uranium weapons in Iraq in the 1990s raise questions about
whether the values of humanity are receiving their due regard in proportionality
assessments by military decision-makers.
Chapter two provided a thorough examination of general principles of
international law. It demonstrated that these principles are particularly useful in filling
gaps in international law; in unifying different areas of international law, like IHL and
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IEL; in helping to develop international law, just as the last decades have seen the
increasing development of a more environmentally conscious international community;
and in interpreting existing international law. This chapter helps to frame the later
discussion in chapter six, in which general principles of law are used to interlink IHL and
the principles of IEL in order to achieve the intended protections for civilians and the
environment in armed conflict.
Chapters four and five turned to consideration of IEL. They examined the links
between IEL and sustainable development, a concept that is also clearly linked to armed
conflict. These chapters focused primarily on the two principles of international law I
proposed employing to guide proportionality assessments under IHL: intergenerational
equity and the precautionary principle. Together, these principles raise awareness about
the importance of considering not only short-term but long-term consequences of our
decisions. The current world already faces problems caused by past generations who
failed to consider the long-term consequences of their choices, such as climate change,
ozone depletion, acid rain, deforestation and the extinction of species. While there may
be scientific uncertainty at times as to the exact nature or degree of harm that might be
realized, if actions are taken without adequate regard to the consequences, it may be too
late to undo the damage. For example, the environment and people of Vietnam continue,
even four decades after the Vietnam War, to suffer the effects of chemical defoliants
used.660 The dictates of military necessity would have to be exceptionally high to find this
type of action acceptable in light of modern values of humanity and the environment.
Chapter six takes these principles of IEL and looks at the application of IEL in
armed conflicts. While traditional approaches to IHL saw it as displacing all other
international law as lex specialis, it is clear that modern approaches no longer accept this
assertion. In particular, the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion demonstrates that,
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during armed conflict, the rules and customs of IHL do not operate to the exclusion of all
others. Instead, other areas of law, such as human rights and IEL, continue to operate and
provide guidance in the application and interpretation of IHL. As such, there is no reason
not to use intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle to guide decisionmakers’ analyses of proportionality for a proposed attack.
The second half of chapter six, therefore, took existing IHL and applied it to the
Kosovo cluster munitions and Iraq depleted uranium examples using the principles of
IEL to guide this application. The markers of long-term thinking, serious harm and
scientific uncertainty provide greater detail and understanding of the considerations of
humanity being balanced against military necessity. Furthermore, they provide greater
clarity against which to evaluate the decisions of military actors to ensure they are
adequately performing their obligations in conducting these assessments justly and not
disregarding humanitarian considerations. The analysis suggests that a proportionality
assessment, guided by principles of IEL, might actually provide greater protection for the
environment and civilians that the specific provisions dedicated to environmental
protection with their strict and high threshold.
While this thesis makes a strong case for using principles of IEL to guide
proportionality assessments in IHL, there are some limitations to the research that must
be acknowledged. An important limitation of this work is that it focuses on international
armed conflicts as opposed to internal or non-international conflicts. The distinction
between international and internal conflicts remains complicated and at times
controversial. Furthermore, the content of customary law applying to internal armed
conflicts is less clear and the conventional law less developed. Thus, restricting the
approach of this thesis, for now, to international armed conflicts allows for a more
straightforward analysis. However, it is postulated that similar benefits would arise by
using IEL to provide content to the IHL governing non-international armed conflict.
A second limitation of this thesis is that it only considers two principles of IEL.
These two principles were chosen because they consider both short-term and long-term
harms as well as scientific uncertainty. These considerations are important when dealing
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with the environment and human health, but they are also highly relevant in armed
conflicts, particularly with regards the types of weapons used. However, there are
potentially other principles of IEL that would be equally applicable. For example,
sustainable development was discussed briefly in this thesis, but a more in-depth look at
its links with armed conflict and the environment could provide insight on further means
of improving protections for civilians and the environment in wartime. The “polluter
pays” principle which places the burden of remediating polluted areas should be assumed
by the person responsible for causing the pollution also has the potential to be useful in
redressing situations of harms from past conflicts. Similarly, there are also other areas of
international law that may provide principles that could prove useful in IHL and in the
protection of the environment. The strong links between human rights, the environment
and armed conflict have already been noted and emerging human rights to development
and a healthy environment could influence decision-making in armed conflicts.
A final limitation is that this thesis does not delve in to the issue of implementing
the proposed approach within the international community. It develops the justification
for the approach and applies it to real examples, taking this as a natural ending point and
leaving for future research the political, legal and civil society issues that would likely
have to be faced in order to see the approach fully implemented and realized in practice.
Other areas for future research include extending considerations of the operation
of these laws and principles to non-state actors who increasingly take on greater roles,
both directly and indirectly, in armed conflicts: for instance, the increasing use of private
military companies and the role of arms manufacturers. Exploring the extension of
protections for the environment in internal armed conflicts is also an important avenue to
pursue. Future research might also examine the means of reconciling principles of
sustainability and sustainable development with the inherently destructive nature of
armed conflict.
In sum, military necessity in recent conflicts has appeared to be taking precedence
over concerns for the protection of civilians and the environment. The approach proposed
in this thesis has the potential to regain the proper balance between military necessity and
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humanitarian concerns. It has the potential to save lives and preserve the planet for
generations to come. Ultimately, it has the power to restore humanity to humanitarian
law.
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